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 ABSTRACT 
Government expenditure is a very instrumental demand tool in achieving economic stability and 
policy makers frequently use it to influence certain economic outcomes. Government 
expenditure majorly consists of two components: investment and consumption components. 
Many researchers concede that higher level of government consumption expenditure is growth 
retarding and therefore undesirable. The aim of the study was establish the economic, structural 
and political and institutional determinants of government consumption expenditure in Kenya. 
Government consumption expenditure in Kenya has grown relatively faster from Ksh 31.2732 
billion in 1963 to Ksh 2107.2 billion in 2018. There is still scanty literature on this topic and yet 
consumption expenditure accounts for more than 55% of Kenya’s total public spending every 
year. Because Shonchoy (2010) panel analysis suffers from cross-sectional heterogeneity and 
fails to be informative about Kenya’s consumption spending, it became a motivation to examine 
the causes for the rise in Kenya’s government consumption expenditure. Studies done by Kanano 
(2006) explained the reasons behind growth in gross expenditure, while Maingi (2010) and 
Abwoga (2013) focused on the effects of public consumption expenditure on economic growth 
in Kenya. However, their studies did not attempt to explain the causes of its growth. Oketch, T. 
O. and Linge, T. (2018) examined the determinants of recurrent public expenditure in Kenya but, 
however, reduced their scope and narrowed  on salaries/wages, social contribution and non-wage 
related variables such as rent & utilities, travelling expenses, hospitality and other consumables 
and that focus makes this study deviate from  their study. In light of this arguement, this study 
followed quantitative and correlational studies design to establish the reasons for rise in 
consumption expenditure in Kenya and drawing from the public choice approach, three models 
were used:(i) Economic model; consisted of gross domestic product, foreign aid, inflation rate, 
foreign direct investment, interest rate, trade openness and external debt stock (ii) Structural 
model; consisted of urbanization rate, young population (below 15 years) and old population 
(above 64 years) (iii) Politico-institutional model; comprised of market liberalization, political 
liberty, political cohesion, corruption and elections. Published data obtained from World Bank, 
Country Data Portal (2018) were used. Following cointegration test results on the time series 
data for the period 1963-2017, VECM, VAR and OLS estimations techniques were adopted. The 
results were that in the long-run, while 1USD increase in GDP causes USD1.3 increase in 
government consumption expenditure, a unit increase in inflation rate would cause USD1.8 
increase in consumption expenditure. However, 1USD increase in foreign direct investment and 
external debt stock causes, respectively, USD 0.07 and USD 2.6 drop in government 
consumption expenditure. Corruption, democracy and political instability have positive effects 
on government consumption expenditure in Kenya. Urbanization and population dynamics 
jointly affect the variable in the short-run. This study recommends that the government should 
strengthen its institutions that are mandated to deal with graft cases, create peaceful political 
setting at all times and ensure a friendly environment to foreign investors.  
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 CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview  
This chapter presents the background information to the study, objectives, significance, scope, 
and the research questions of the study. Section 1.2 discusses background information to the 
research problem; section 1.3 contains policies which have continued to shape government 
expenditure in Kenya, section 1.4 presents the statement of the research problem, section 1.5 
contains the objectives of the study, section 1.6 presents the hypothesis of the study, while 
sections 1.7 and 1.8 present the significance and the scope of the scope of the study respectively.  
1.2 Background Information 
Public expenditure is an ecclesiastical function of any government. Economy is always demand 
driven and in cases where there is a fall in household and private sector aggregate demand, then 
it becomes the responsibility of the government, as a principle, to take up the mantle to 
invigorate the economy through public expenditure as this helps to raise the fallen aggregate 
demand. It is believed that expenditure is a critical tool which governments, in cases of market 
distortions, usually use to bring about equitable distribution of income and wealth and hence, 
create stability in prices, manage inflation and spur growth. According to Musgrave (1989), it is 
because of the existence of market distortions that the state is required in the provision public 
goods and services. Governments would always struggle to cope up with such demands as the 
major goal of any government is to provide quality services to the citizens and also to increase 
development. For a nation to create a productive workforce and quality human capital, the 
government needs to extend quality services to the working population, and as the demand for 
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such services scales up, government expenses are bound to grow along with it. It is also believed 
that government spending is an essential driver towards achieving efficiency in the allocation of 
scarce resources and spurring economic activities of a nation. 
There are two components of public expenditure; development expenditure and recurrent 
expenditure which the government can use to create certain economic outcomes. But in doing 
this development-recurrent ratio must be observed. However, it has been observed that 
development-recurrent ratio favors recurrent components and that creates development 
expenditure problem (Were, 2018). Government consumption expenditure is prone to increase 
and is often favored to development expenditure in circumstances of fiscal stringency and this is 
even glaring in the global scenes. World government consumption expenditure grew from USD 
2,583 trillion in 1960 to USD 55,360 trillion in 2017. Growth in world’s consumption 
expenditure has been on the rise and reached its ever highest peak of USD 106,300 trillion in the 
year 2014 and this high peak was possibly attributed to fiscal expansion that many countries had 
to undergo after 2008 to counter the economic downturn from the negative global and domestic 
shocks. However, post fiscal consolidation periods following the global shock in oil prices have 
since been characterized by a fall in the level of government consumption expenditure in the 
whole world as shown in the figure below. 
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Figure 1: World Consumption Expenditure 
Source: World Bank, 2018 
Kenya’s trend in government consumption does depart much from the world trends except for 
the last couple of years following post fiscal consolidation of the 2008 world shocks. It was 
expected that government expenditure would fall after recovery from the global shocks, 
however, consumption expenditure continued to trend upwards even long after economic 
recovery strategies adopted between 2008 and 2010.  
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Figure 2: Kenya’s Consumption Expenditure 
Source: World Bank, 2018 
Kenya has experienced increases in government expenditure in the last decade, where the public 
wage bill has increased tremendously and has accounted for a bigger share of the government 
budget outturns despite cautions that higher growth in recurrent expenditure relative 
development expenditure is a proscribed phenomenon by many governments since it is deemed 
growth retarding. In Kenya, there has been a steady growth in government’s recurrent account 
where government consumption expenditure grew by 287.4 percent over the period 2002-2014. 
Between the years 2004-2014, government consumption expenditure rose by 202.6 percent. 
However, between the years 2009-2014, government consumption expenditure grew by 54.4 
percent (The Republic of Kenya, 2015).  
The lowest value of consumption expenditure that Kenya ever recorded was USD 86,715,965.24 
in 1960 and the highest value of USD 10,687,876,290.12 in the year 2017 with an average of 
USD 2,330,652,945.90. It is notable that after the 2008/2010 fiscal consolidation period 
5 
 
government expenditure was meant come down and indeed growth in consumption expenditure 
dropped from 26. 2 % in 2007, further dropped to 20.3 % in 2008 and finally to 0.11 % in 2009. 
However, this drop did not stay as the country found itself in an expansion path of huge 
government consumption expenditure recording 19 % and 12 % growth in consumption 
expenditure in the year 2012 and 2013 respectively. This sudden expansion could be due to the 
roll out of devolution which had seen a speedy upsurge of administrative expenses, increased 
security spending, and the rising wage bill which has been associated with both national and 
county government employees. On average, based on the past five years, Kenya tops the East 
African countries in consumption expenditure with USD 8,757,880,222.04 followed by Tanzania 
with USD 6,693,052,622.84. Somalia, Burundi and Rwanda are the least spenders in government 
consumption with USD 317,859,302.75, USD 635,739,775.28 and 1,182,610,788.62 
respectively, on average.   
 
Figure 3: Eastern African Countries Consumption Expenditure 
Source: World Bank, 2018 
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Kenya and Tanzania remain towering among all Eastern African countries probably because of 
their size in terms of population. Kenya’s growth in consumption expenditure has been attributed 
to a number of fiscal pressures emanating from elections and their subsequent repeats, huge 
administrative expenses both at national and county governments and expenses towards drought 
mitigation measures which often occasion high tides in government expenditure. Kenya’s plot of 
growth in government consumption expenditure exhibits high peaks and spikes and has even 
remained above world growth rate. The high spikes are indications of likelihood of disturbances 
on government spending that operate within the structure of the economy.  
 
Key: HIPC, Heavily Indebted Pour Countries 
Figure 4: Consumption Expenditure Growth by Category 
Source: World Bank, 2018 
 Surprisingly, Kenya’s growth in consumption expenditure is even higher than the World’s 
growth rate and far much above the heavily indebted countries as seen in figure 4 above. 
Government consumption growth comparisons between Kenya and Eastern African countries 
also reveal a similar observation. Even though latest trend show that there is a decline in the rate 
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of government consumption expenditure across countries in Eastern Africa and the World over, 
Kenya still records higher rates in expenditure than any of the Eastern Africa counterparts. 
 
Figure 5: Eastern African Countries Consumption Expenditure Growth 
Source: World Bank, 2018 
Following the foregoing, we can see that government consumption expenditure in Kenya has an 
outstanding growth and this has often devastating implications on the government budget, 
sometimes resulting in reduction in development budget. In 2017/2018 financial year, the 
development budget expenditure was reduced by Ksh 30.6 billion juxtaposed with increase in 
consumption expenditure (Were, 2018). The high level of consumption expenditure should be 
checked because it has ripple effects to the economy. It has a direct impact on budget structure 
leading to huge fiscal deficits, causes wage-price spiral linked with macroeconomic instability 
such as inflation, unstable debt management and loss of competiveness in the economy. Kenya 
government is facing difficulties in managing its consumption spending, in particular with the 
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devolved units of governance. From time to time, workers represented by their unions have 
pushed for better pay and salaries, and this has always called for the restructuring of the 
government budget. This mounting pressure sometimes force the government into borrowing but 
this would only further aggravates the situation as it increases local debt. There have been grave 
concerns by policymakers that there is the tendency of blossoming government expenditure 
causing inflation to shoot to soaring levels and moreover interest sensitive investment in the 
economy tends to go down due to low savings and higher cost of borrowing (Oketch, T. O. and 
Linge, T., 2018).  While Maingi (2010) illustrated the effects of consumption expenditure on 
economic growth, Kanano (2006) demonstrated the determinants of total public expenditure. 
Shonchoy(2010) used panel analysis to model determinants of government consumption 
expenditure among 111 developing nations, while Oketch, T. O. and Linge, T. (2018) focused on 
wages and allowances and  consumables to elaborate the determinants of recurrent expenditure 
in Kenya. In light of this, this study sought to establish the determinants of government 
consumption expenditure in Kenya with special focus on three streams of variables; economic, 
structural and politico-institutional variables using series data for the period 1963-2017. 
1.3 Expenditure Policies and Government Consumption Expenditure Trends in Kenya 
Strategic investment plans have always backed the pursuit of sustainable economic growth in 
Kenya. According to Jerono (2009), the size and distribution of government spending have 
changed a great deal since Kenya got political independence in the early 1960s. Several 
Sessional Papers have guided the pattern of government spending in Kenya; Medium Term 
Plans, the Kenyan vision 2030 and the Constitution. The annual percentage growth of 
government consumption expenditure has been more than the increase in capital expenditure 
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since pre-independence. This alludes to the fact that in the 1960s the government was guided by 
African Socialism, a concept based on the eradication of poverty, ignorance, and disease. The 
government had to take over the responsibility of providing basic needs. Thus, in the subsequent 
years, inefficiency and mismanagement plagued the public sector; corruption, wastages in 
government ministries and excessive members of parliament salaries have accounted for soaring 
consumption expenditure in the late 1960s.   
In 1986, the Kenyan government declared her intentions to downsize its public expenses and in 
pursuit of this, published Economic Management for Renewed Economic Growth sessional 
paper to provide controls to government spending. This strategic reform forced the government 
to cut back on expenditure due to pressure from the international community and development 
partners over the structure of its public spending.  The decision to reduce government expenses 
encouraged more consumption and paying local and foreign debts as a trade-off for capital 
expenditure outlay.  
In the 1990s, IMF persuaded Kenya to accent to Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), and 
there was a consensual agreement between IMF and the Kenyan government to reduce its 
allocation to capital expenditure especially on government parastatals. The SAPs were meant to 
reinvigorate and stir up African economies regarding enhanced saving, efficient use of scarce 
public resources and restructuring of parastatals for efficiency and competitiveness. The SAPs 
advocated for decontrol of prices, reforms in civil service, floating interest rates and liberation of 
trade (O'Brien and Ryan, 1999). According to Kenyan Economic Survey (1992), the first SAP to 
be implemented was privatization of key parastatals in Kenya which were mainly meant to create 
a culture of ethics and, sound management practices in the remaining non-privatized parastatals 
10 
 
and to reduce the bailout burden the parastatals had placed on the government. Thus, the 
implementation of both SAPs and Economic Management for Renewed Growth strategies 
seemed to work on the path of the government to downsize its consumption expenditure. 
Government consumption expenditure grew by 372 percent over the period 1974-1984. 
However, over the period 1984-1994, according to (GoK, 1999) government consumption 
expenditure growth dropped to 258 percent from 372 percent of the previous decade. Therefore, 
the lower percentage increase in government consumption over the period 1984-1994 reflected 
the government efforts to contain the then skyrocketing consumption expenditure.  
In 1993, the Government of Kenya introduced a strategic reform meant to, further, downsize the 
then blossoming public sector workforce which seemed unnecessary financial burden on the 
exchequer (World Bank, 2003). Consequently, the government introduced the golden handshake 
program (voluntary early retirement) to manage and reduce the size of the public sector. 
According to (Gok, 2003), this strategy saw a reduction in civil service workforce from around 
272,000 in 1991 to around 194,900 in 2002. However, government consumption expenditure still 
increased by 262.4 percent over the period 1991-2002 compared to 90.1 percent increase realized 
over the period 1986-199. 
After 2002, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) government, as part of its flagship projects 
and political agenda, embarked on massive infrastructure development as enshrined in the 
Strategy for Poverty Eradication Sessional Paper of 2002. In 2003, NARC government laid more 
emphasis on development spending and Development budget was prepared to cater for free 
primary Education, rural electrification, and construction of roads and improvement of health 
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care. However, the percentage increase in government consumption expenditure still rose to 
154.8 percent over the period 2002-2008 from 61.4 percent in 1997-2002.  
Having conceived the idea to tolerate the minimum possible levels of public expenses, according 
to (GoK, 2012),  the government of Kenya formulated a number of expenditure plans to ensure 
that it remains in the long run economic development trajectory; the government had to put in 
place short-term plans to keep her on the development path. In 2007, thus, the government of 
Kenya launched a Medium Term Plan (MTP) to run for the period 2008-2012 aimed at 
improving real GDP growth from an estimated 7 percent in 2007 to a double-digit percentage 
growth over the period 2009-2012. Between the period 2008-2012, savings and investment levels 
were expected to increase to support economic growth and employment creation envisaged under 
the plan. Consequently, under the plan, growth in government consumption expenditure which 
had risen to 154.8 percent over the period 2002-2008 dropped to 107.8 percent for the period 
2008-2014. However, 107.8 percent increase in government consumption expenditure realized 
over the 2008-2015 period, is still higher than the percentage increases in government 
consumption expenditure achieved in the 1960s and the late 1970s. These figures show that, 
despite all the efforts which have been put in by the government, government consumption 
spending only continues to increase, sometimes at a slower rate like in the 1960s and sometimes 
at higher rates like in the 1980s as well as in the last decade.     
The creation of new structures of governance (devolved units) and the devolution of services in 
the year 2013 under the new Constitution of Kenya is further believed to cause variations in the 
level of government consumption expenditure. Government consumption expenditure has 
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remained high, though, it decreased slightly in growth from 13.6 percent in the year 2013 to 11.8 
percent in the year 2015 (see Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6: Government Consumption Expenditure Trend in Kenya 
Source: World Bank, 2018 
Government consumption expenditure in Kenya has expanded tremendously, having increased 
by 17410 percent over the period 1963-2018. On the other hand, the GDP grew by only 6742 
percent over the same period. The growth in government consumption expenditure more than 
doubled the growth in the GDP over the period 1963-2018.          
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Figure 7: GDP, Recurrent and Development Expenditures Growth Rates 
Source: World Bank, 2018 
1.4 Statement of the Problem 
Studying movements in government expenditure is central to state planning and of much concern 
is the composition of public expenditure. Government consumption expenditure is a very crucial 
part of government budget as it has always formed the major portion the budget almost in all 
countries across the world. In Kenya, government consumption has shown rapid growth from 
Ksh 31.2732 billion in 1963 to Ksh 2107.2 billion in the year 2018. Noting this relatively high 
level of consumption expenditure, the World Bank and IDA have issued caution to Kenya to 
downsize her consumption expenditure to create room for investment expenditure (Were, 2018; 
Kinuthia, 2018). The question that then lingers is how then should the government slash down 
consumption expenditure? The government has to identify the causes of growth to consumption 
spending and be able to effectively restrain the high tides exhibited in consumption expenditure 
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in Kenya. While Kanano (2006) modelled the determinants of total public expenditure growth in 
Kenya, Maingi (2010) sought to establish the effects of consumption expenditure on economic 
growth in Kenya.  However, both of them did not model the causes of consumption expenditure. 
Shonchoy (2010) modelled the determinants of consumption among developing countries but it 
suffers the shortcomings of panel analysis to apply in the Kenyan case.  Thus, in light of this 
exposition, this study endeavored to establish the determinants of government consumption 
expenditure in Kenya using time series data for the period 1963-2017.  
1.5 Objectives of the Study  
1.5.1 The Broad Objective 
The broad purpose of this study was to establish the determinants of public consumption 
spending in Kenya. 
1.5.2 Specific Objectives  
The broad objective of this study is broken down into the following specific objectives:  
i. To establish the economic determinants of government consumption spending in Kenya. 
ii. To examine the structural determinants of government consumption spending in Kenya. 
iii. To establish the politico-institutional determinants of government consumption spending 
in Kenya. 
1.6 Research Hypotheses 
Upon fitting the data on the above three models, hypotheses were set in order to ascertain the 
significance of the aforementioned variables after conducting regression analysis. For the t-test 
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of significance to be carried out on the coefficient estimates, the following null and alternative 
hypotheses were considered:  
i. Ho: Economic determinants do not affect government consumption spending in Kenya. 
 
ii. Ho: Structural determinants do not affect consumption spending in Kenya. 
 
iii. Ho: Politico-institutional determinants do not affect government consumption spending in 
Kenya. 
1.7 Significance of the Study  
The main reason for carrying out this study is to determine various driving factors to the growth 
of government consumption expenditure in Kenya. The results of this study are very crucial as it 
can be used to assist policy makers in containing and explaining the growth of government 
consumption expenditure in Kenya. The study comes at a time when Kenya government has to 
make very important decisions on the public wage bill and finds it very difficult to downsize its 
consumption expenditure due to the funding of devolution of services and constant strikes waged 
by unions representing teachers, nurses, and doctors. The study also contributes to the available 
literature by providing empirical evidence on determinants of government consumption 
expenditure in Kenya.  
1.8 The Scope of the Study  
This study has used time series data for the period 1963-2017 and it is worth noting that the 
period 1963 to 2017 remains of great concern as it adequately covers major world economic 
incidences which form part of the variables used in the study. Among the world economic shocks 
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falling within this time span include; the 1974 financial depression, the 1994 drought, and the 
periods of structural changes.  Notable structural adjustment programs of the time were; the 
socialism policy of the 1960s, and the SAPs of the 1990s. Different political regimes such as the 
multi-party democracy of 1992/1997, the NARC government of 2002/2007, the coalition 
government of 2008/2012 and the devolved system of 2013 could have influenced the direction 
of growth in government consumption expenditure. Known political disturbances during this 
time include the famous 1990 Saba Saba riots call for democracy, 2008 post-election violence 
and 2017 post-poll tensions. The study focuses on Kenya, East Africa's leading economy and the 
results of this study can be of relevance to the rest of East Africa.  
 
 
17 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter is divided into three sections: section 2.2 illustrates the theoretical literature review, 
while sections 2.3 and 2.4 present the empirical literature review and summary of the literature 
review respectively. Theories which have been put forward about government consumption 
expenditure are considered under theoretical literature review while empirical literature review 
focuses on studies which have been done on government consumption spending. The summary 
of literature review highlights the extent to which research has been done in finding out the 
causes of growth in government consumption expenditure with a view to establishing possible 
literature links and gaps. 
2.2 Theoretical Literature Review 
For many years, varied theoretical models have been formulated to provide explanations to 
increases in state spending. They include constructs by Friedman (1979); Wiseman & Peacock 
(1961); Wagner (1893); Musgrave (1973) and Keynes (1936).  
Adolph Wagner (1893), a German scholar and a famous economist in the late 19th century 
conducted an in-depth study on government expenditure. In his study, he postulated “the law of 
increasing state functions," which considers state spending as a behavioral variable that 
positively responds to the changes in a growing economy. There is the likelihood of a true link 
between state spending and income as well as economic growth. As an economy gradually 
increases in scale with time, the roles and responsibilities of the government increase. There are 
intrinsic dispositions for the roles of separate units of a state (such as county and sub-county 
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government structures) to increase with time, both intensively and extensively and consequently, 
these growths in government activities cause a corresponding growth in public spending. 
Simultaneous growth in government spending and gross domestic product can be attributed to 
three reasons: First, the responsibility of the state in providing basic security as well as its role in 
controlling economic activities are likely to become more enormous and expansive because of 
the growing complexity of economic life and urbanization, which occur especially during 
industrial transformation. Second, as a country undergoes industrial transformation, government 
sector activity tends to substitute for private sector activity because administrative functions and 
defensive roles of a state increase fundamentally during this process of industrial transformation. 
Finally, government spending on social protection and welfare programs (including education 
and transfer payments) also continues to grow as a country industrializes due to the raised 
elasticity of demand for these services; this is an assumption which is clearly implied in 
Wagner's work. Thus, as the national income increases, the income elasticity of demand for 
services offered by the state increases quickly, increasing the proportion of public sector 
expenditure in GDP. According to Abizadeh and Yousefi (1988), the size of government grows 
as an effect of industrialization. The richer a society becomes, the more the government spends 
in order to alleviate social and industrial stress. Therefore, in Wagner’s approach, economic 
growth causes government expenditure through an increase in demand for public goods and 
services and also through redistribution as a course towards achieving equity in the society. 
 According to Keynes (1936), government spending is justified because it is considered as a 
platform for creating jobs and employing underutilized capital when an economy undergoes a 
recession with low levels of employment of labour and capital. The hypothesis is that during 
economic slumps, an expansionary budget policy is necessary to raise the aggregate demand in 
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an economy, thus boosting gross national income. This has the implication that growth in state 
spending lead to greater employment in public sector and firms in the business community 
through the government multiplier process. Keynes continues to observe that when employment 
of labour and capital continues to rise, output and income of companies also increase, and as a 
result, businesses hire more labour to produce the goods and services needed by the government. 
In the event that production process does not go to full employment as in the case of many 
developing economies, one noticeable situation is the unemployment uproar in the labour 
market. At this point the state is expected to exogenously change the production process through 
its expenditure.  In Kenya, there has been outcry of massive unemployment of youths and, in 
fact, recent statistics show that the scenario is at its highest peak of 11.8 percent in 2016. To put 
the economy in a development trajectory that would ensure maximum employment, then 
government intervention looks quite necessary. Thus, this theory seems more applicable in the 
Kenyan case in which the wage bill is steadily increasing. 
 
Keynes’s theory which asserts that public spending is necessary to stimulate economic 
productivity and enhance creation of wealth, nonetheless, is challenged by Stratmann & Okolski 
(2010) who argue that there are several spending ways for governments, some of which are 
unproductive. Government spending activities could be overwhelmingly large to the extent that it 
becomes extremely difficult in knowing where goods and services can be most productively 
allocated and, thus, state spending may not be incurred on the desired priority areas and fails to 
identify appropriate projects where it would generate maximum benefit to the society. Further, 
the Keynesian theory disagrees with the classical and neoclassical economic views of public 
income and state expenditure. Although the two classes of economic thought are in concurrence 
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that budgetary constraint or deficit financing could encourage creation of goods and services, the 
neoclassical school of thought sees no reason to believe that the benefit of this stimulus would 
exceed the displacement effects that state spending would have on private investment. They 
argue that such economic stimulus programs would shift the demand for labour, increase the cost 
of hiring labour and becomes a barrier to profiteering private firms. Further, such increases in 
public spending would lead to accumulation of bonds and other state securities. In the meantime, 
their demand fall and consequently the price of the bonds would also fall causing the money 
market to tighten and interest rates begin to rise to levels which cannot be afforded by private 
individuals. Consequently, attempts to revamp the economy would be self-reversing since 
extremely high rate of interest would increase the cost of asset financing. Hayek (1989) also 
disagreed with Keynesian economic think points about what he basically called collectivist 
approach. He argues that the notion of a fiscal stimulus is accompanied with centralized planning 
and results to wrong expenditure of state revenue which may also result in business shocks. 
The median voter hypothesis assumes that the median voter plays a significant role in 
determining the level of spending by the government (Alm and Embaye 2010). Consequently, 
the demand for public services is considered to be driven by factors such as the median voter’s 
preferences, income, tax-price and relative price of private goods and services (Bowen 1943). 
One of the earliest studies offering a formal representation and empirical estimation of the 
median voter model is that of Borcherding and Deacon (2004), which analyses the demand for 
public services provided by the non-federal governments in the USA. Niskanen (1978) 
developed the median voter model to estimate government spending and demand for public 
goods and services by the voters. According to this model a voter’s demand function is assumed 
to have the following form:  
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Q=AsκYλZμ ………………………………………………………………………………..2.1  
Where:  
Q = quantity of the public good demanded by the median voter  
s = the perceived per unit price of government services paid by the median voter  
Y = the median voter’s income  
Z = other exogenous conditions affecting the demand for government services,  
And where A is a scale parameter and (κ λ and μ) are parameters of the demand function with    
κ˂ 0, λ˃ 0, and μ˃0  
Then, given the median voter’s share of the unit cost of government services (α), the perceived 
per unit price of public services paid by the median voter (Ѕ), the median voter’s demand 
function is as follows:   
CQ=AαKC1+KYλZμ………………………………………………………………………....2.2  
Where:  
C= Marginal cost  
CQ= Government spending per capita  
The variable (α), which represents the median voter’s tax share, is assumed to be a function of 
the fraction of government expenditure financed by tax revenues and the total number of 
taxpayers, as follows:  
α=(R/E)(1/N) ……………………………………………………...…………………..…….2.3  
Where R is the total tax revenues, E is the total government spending and N is the total number 
of voter-taxpayers. It is also assumed that the marginal cost (C) is a function of the private sector 
wage rate (W) and the total number of voter-taxpayers (N), as follows:   
C=BWσNφ ………………………………………………………………………………...2.4  
22 
 
Where (B) is the scale parameter, and (σ) measures the rate of increase in the price of 
government services relative to that of services in other sectors while (φ) captures the degree of 
publicness of services offered by the government.  
Substituting equations 2.3 and 2.4 into equation 2.2 leads to the following:  
CQ=A(𝑅𝐸1𝑁)k(BWσNφ)1+kYλZμ=AB1+K(R/E)KWσ(1+k)Nφ(1+k)-kYλZμ……….……..2.5  
This equation may be used to explain real aggregate government spending per capita G and its 
relationship to the variables in the median voter model. However, as the median voter model 
might not capture all the variations in government spending per capita, several other exogenous 
variables may be included during estimation.    
Ernst Engel was also a German economist writing almost the same time as Adolph Wagner in the 
19th century. Engel pointed out over a century ago that the composition of the consumer budget 
changes as family income increases, Zimmerman (1932). A smaller share comes to be spent on 
certain goods such as work clothing and a larger share on others, such as for coats, expensive 
jewelries etc. As average income increase, smaller charges in the consumption pattern for the 
economy may occur. At the earlier stages of national development, there is need for overhead 
capital such as roads, harbors, power installations, pipe-borne water etc. But as the economy 
developed, one would expect the public share in capital formation to decline over time. 
Individual expenditure pattern is thus compared to national expenditure and Engel finding is 
referred to as the declining portion of outlays on foods. 
The Armey curve originates from the theories of market and government failure. The theory of 
market failures justifies government intervention to correct externalities and provide public 
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goods. The theory of government failures on the other hand focuses on the possible harmful 
effect of the State’s activity and expansion (Grossman, 1988). According to Armey (1995) low 
government intervention increases economic growth until it reaches a certain level; nevertheless, 
excessive government expenditure reduces economic growth. The presence of a government and 
the provision of public goods create a growth-enhancing environment in the economy. 
Government contributions for regulation and up-keep of law and order further contribute to the 
growth of the economy by creating a safe economic atmosphere. Any expansion of government 
spending in the economy initially is associated with an expansion in output. Nevertheless, as 
spending rises, additional projects financed by the government become increasingly less 
productive. In addition, the taxes and borrowings levied to finance disproportionate ventures 
impose increasing burdens, thus creating disincentives to workers. At some point, the marginal 
benefits from increased government spending reach zero. Armey (1995) puts this phenomenon 
into a graphical perspective when he makes use of a graphical technique to explain the 
relationship between government spending and economic growth. Armey consequently indicates 
that the size of the government and the growth of the economy can be modeled as a quadratic 
function, that is, a concave curve, which assumes a role for both the linear term and the squared 
term of government expenditure in the economic growth process.    
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At point A government intervention is low and as government size increases GDP continues to 
grow up to point B which is the optimum government size. Further increase in government size 
beyond this point yields a decline in GDP growth. The Armey curve therefore demonstrates the 
relation between government expenditure and economic growth and hypothesizes that an optimal 
size of government expenditure exists (Pevcin, 2004).   Maingi (2010) employed this technique 
to obtain government size for the case of Kenya and found that the optimal government size was 
at 23 % of the GDP. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Friedman (1979) conceptualized the “tax and spend hypothesis” which states that variations in 
state income are capable providing insights to changes that occur in public expenditure. 
According to Friedman (1979), public spending is characterized by unidirectional effect ranging 
from state income to public spending. By hypothesis, Friedman suggests that growth of state 
income would occasion a similar change in state spending.  
Wiseman and Peacock (1961) observe that public expenditure increases when states struggle and 
strive to meet demands made by the citizens concerning various services that they need. 
According to them, there may be differing opinions about what is the acceptable level of public 
spending and the desirable taxation caps and limits. Divergences in pinions eventually boil to 
widespread shocks in the form of devastating political turmoil and aggressions. The disturbances, 
as Peacock and Wiseman (1961) substantiate, have a causal effect on the size of government 
expenditure, creating shifting effects, and consequently moving both public revenue and 
government spending to new levels. In the meantime, government begins to realize fiscal 
deficits, inadequate revenue collection and there would be growing need to raise taxes to meet 
fiscal targets. Before any consensus is reached concerning tax and revenue limits, citizens are 
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likely to show their displeasure by way of riots and demonstrations. The government would be 
forced to make changes to the contentious and intolerable tax rates and adopt new tax levels, 
which Wiseman and Peacock called ‘tax tolerance level’,  which is generally acceptable to 
individuals. In addition, the citizens will anticipate the government to rejuvenate the production 
of goods and services and remain alive to emerging issues in the society which would otherwise 
provoke the already healed society and which in consequence would create an environment for 
the recurrence of the previous shocks. Further, critics of state expenditure hypothesize that the 
time interval for displacement is recognized as weakening determents to shielding the 
independence of sub government units and vesting more powers of the central government on 
public expenditure. During this process of reduction in local autonomy and centralization of state 
expenditure, the role of central government in expenditure projects seems to become larger and 
larger, a scenario referred to as the ‘concentration process of increasing public sector activities’.  
Thus, there are tendencies of countries experiencing huge budget estimates during times of war 
and such cases would force the government to devise strategic ways of raising additional 
revenues to meet the increase in defense expenditure and reconstruction costs. Such growth in 
revenue, therefore, gives rise to increased government expenditure. That is to say; government 
spending is driven by great economic crises which can change public expenditure. Therefore, 
seemingly there is a possible positive correlation between government size and government tax 
revenues. Collection of tax revenues and accumulation of income is expected to increase as a 
country goes through years of economic development and public expenditure, undoubtedly, 
would increase as states develop and become more complex in functions. 
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 Another approach to public expenditure is the concept of maximum social advantage. It is based 
on the concept of equal marginal benefit which states that a rational person would spend his/her 
earnings on alternative choice of commodities in such a manner that the extra benefit of the last 
shilling incurred on either commodity remains equal. According to Dalton (1920), state or public 
expenditure in whichever way must be conducted as long as any accruing benefit to the society 
from an additional small units in spending in whatever manner  just balances any  misfortune 
arising from small increment in levies and  also in revenues which are collected from various 
means of consolidating national income. This balance between income and expenditure is what 
Dalton refers to as the optimal of both state spending and government revenue. In this regard, 
there would be a circular flow of wealth in which taxes generated from the citizens, directly or 
indirectly, would still find their way back to the citizens in the form of state investment 
programs. Dalton argues that when there is no ideal balance between public income and public 
expenditure, taxpayers are bound to lose to those gaining from the expenditure program which is 
extended to meet societal goals. Further, for the taxpayers to benefit from these streams of flow 
of income disbursements, the amount of tax paid by an individual must be strictly less than the 
gains. Pigou (1932) hypothesized that welfare economics is classified into two major categories, 
which include, the production and the distribution. Pigou suggests a standard measure of gauging 
an optimal tax level which can be used to analyze and synthesize possible loses and possible 
gains to offset negative externalities in state expenditures. This optimal level of tax has come to 
be called the pigou tax rate. Circumstances of maximum social advantage occur when public 
spending is to be incurred in a manner that demonstrates the fact that utility obtained from the 
last shilling spent is equal to the utility sacrificed with reference to the last shilling incurred in 
form of tax revenues to the state 
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Richard Abel Musgrave (1973), an American economist of German origin, advanced a 
hypothesis which asserts that in early stages of economic growth, public expenditure in the 
economy should be encouraged.  During early stages of growth, there seem to exist market 
distortions which call for active government interventions to deal with such market 
imperfections. Development in nations is accompanied by industrialization of production 
processes and modernizing production techniques and this transitional process to new ways of 
production is normally initiated by governments. In developing nations, the proportions of the 
government activities in an economy continue to grow as there are suspected chronic 
deficiencies in requisite infrastructure such as roads. Countries which begin to industrial would 
exhibit comparatively higher budgetary estimates and that indicates that there is a true link that 
exists between economic growth of a country and increase in the activities of the state in 
economic affairs. At this stage, the growth in public expenditure might be higher than the 
associated growth in the economy; that is, the public sector growing faster than the economy. 
However, there has been wide criticism on increasing government size relative to private 
investment. Emphasis on public expenditure can possibly ignore the contribution to development 
by the private sector by assuming government expenditure is the only stimulus to economic 
growth and as such optimal economic targets might not be achieved, employment of labour and 
other productive resources are likely to fall below equilibrium levels.  
The classical economists, encompassing such great economist of the time as Adam Smith, 
believe that government intervention in an economy is not necessary and that such interventions 
only create more negative externalities than positive externalities in an economy and prescribe an 
increasing role of individuals to propel and to control most of the activities in an economy. 
Adam Smith (1776) shows much support for the "laissez-faire", a situation in which the 
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economy is self-correcting and self-adjusting. The distribution of resources is not determined by 
the state but rather by natural forces prevailing in the commodity market and where economic 
development is not to be propelled by profit-oriented motives. As the classical school of 
thought’s classification goes, the growth in total revenue or domestic income results to a 
symmetrical increase in prices of all commodities, without any change in the manner in which 
resources or even to the level of real national gross domestic product are distributed, a situation 
normally referred to as money neutrality. Presumably, this school of thought, classical, 
hypothesize that production is perfect, that employment of labour and other productive resources 
are always optimal and that there is maximum use. In this case, labour cost and the cost of 
acquiring capital are self-regulated, self-correcting and for a matter of practicality, the 
government wallet should always be at equilibrium as amount of savings is equated to 
investment. Classical economists equate societal progress to a situation in which the economy is 
at its full employment level and matters to do with profit maximization and cost minimization do 
not form part of the goals. 
Monetarists believe that government expenditure, whether tax financed or deficit financed would 
always crowd out private which in turn leads to reduced output. Taxes are disincentives to 
investments because they reduce the disposable income of the general public and as such there 
would be less money left for savings and consequently less investment. On the other hand, they 
also believe deficit financing is equally detrimental to an economy as it causes interest rate to 
rise to unaffordable levels to individuals. Individuals would find it costly to carry out investment 
activities through asset financing and tightening the business environment more specifically in 
the financial market. They argue that the most honorable thing that policy formulators should do 
is to undertake a monetary policy framework as opposed to either fiscal expansion or deficit 
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financing. They continue to affirm that a monetary expansion would work better in stimulating 
growth by reducing inflationary pressure through sale of bonds. 
The Leviathan Theory is also another view on public spending which tries to explain that the 
government’s accrued involvement in the economy tends to diminish as public expenditure and 
taxes are reduced, holding other factors constants. Leviathan theory is based on the fact that the 
national government is generally understood as revenue maximizing leviathan that tries to 
harvest maximum revenue possible via fiscal decentralization of state control on taxation. The 
Leviathan Theory explains that public expenditure by the national government is generally lower 
in an extremely devolved system of governance because each of the  lower units of governance 
(e.g. county governments) are charged with the task of collecting revenue and consequently 
incurring public expenditure at local levels. Further, according to Rodden (2003), devolution of 
national government’s certain fiscal functions to sub government units, essentially, eases the 
fiscal burden pressure on national government. Kenya promulgated a new constitution about nine 
years down the line which outlines a new order of governance and introduced two levels of 
governance; the national government and county governments. The constitution, through the 
county revenue allocation act 2017, transfers expenditure allocations to: level 5 hospitals, 
construction of county headquarters, health facility-forgone user fees, leasing medical 
equipment, and road maintenance all to the county governments. This kind of institutional 
arrangement and in the spirit of the Leviathan Theory has the implication that the expenditure 
categories of the national government are bound to reduce significantly in comparison to pre-
promulgation of the new system of governance. 
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Borcherding and Lee (2004) predict that continued increase in public expenditure is generally 
interpreted in a way as to fall in two major groups, and which include, a-institutional and 
institutional approaches. A-institutional view, on the one hand, has it that the ever increasing 
public expenditure is primarily based on social ramifications and bazaar environments. In this 
method, the median voter’s, presumably, course of action is very instrumental in providing 
explanations and answers to the behavior of public expenditure, and thus the amount of goods 
and services that the government needs to provide to the citizens can be adequately and jointly 
explained by a number factors which include but not only limited to; the voter’s interests, 
income, cost of tax, demography and the relative cost of individually owned commodities. The 
institutional perspective, on the other hand, puts more emphasis on the role of financial 
mismanagement and looting tendencies, structural adjustments and key economic or political 
disturbances which may act as obstacles or even inducements to persistent increases in state 
expenses. 
However, there are opposing views on the size of government expenditure in an economy. One 
such concern held by Alm and Embaye (2010) is that when the government expands, there occur 
undesirable fiscal and economic problems which bring about macroeconomic instability. 
Governments usually finance their activities from taxes, borrowing and printing money. Thus, it 
can be anticipated that considerably larger public size is accompanied by higher tax rates and 
heavy borrowing and such scenarios are always viewed to have devastating impacts in the 
production of a country. The undesirable effects may include slow economic growth, massive 
financial shortages, enormous public debts, soaring price levels and rising costs in the money 
market, unfavorable balance of payments in addition to weakening local currency.   
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 2.2 Empirical Literature Review 
Many theories have been put forward to explain the behavior of government expenditure in 
general. In this study, the context of government of consumption expenditure was divided into 
three streams of literature conforming to three objectives of the study. Following this, three 
categories of literature, economic variables, structural variables and politico-institutional 
variables were discussed in this section.   
2.2.1 Economic Variables 
In this grouping, variables which exhibit cyclical behavior were considered and include gross 
domestic product, foreign aid, inflation rate, interest rate foreign direct investment, trade 
openness, and foreign debt. 
In U.S.A, Uchenna et al. (2008) carried a study on government expenditure applying both 
cointegration technique and Granger causality testing procedures and using time series annual 
data for the period 1970 – 2002. The results indicate that state expenditure and inflation are co 
integrated and, thus, concluded that there seems to show a complete influence in connection with 
the two variables. Inflation and counter-cyclical policies are aimed at increasing taxes during 
booms to maximize revenues and vice-versa. In many cases, countercyclical policies are used to 
stimulate growth and prevent economic imbalances and are expected to increase public expenses 
in the economy. However, this position is in contrast to findings made by Abu (2004) that 
counter-cyclical variations such as inflation do not significantly affect government expenditure. 
Inflation is an interesting variable in explaining government spending and, according to Aubin et 
al., (1988); it is normally considered in order to place seasonal factors into perspective. In the 
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case of financial stringency, it is a common expectation that public spending is reduced when the 
general price level rises and to be increased with increases in the level of unemployment. 
Maingi (2010) notes that state expenses on such public functions as public order; salaries and 
allowances are all significantly and negatively to economic growth. Government spending on 
capital accumulation such as physical infrastructure development and development in education 
is a recipe for enhancing and spurring economic growth in Kenya. However, not all the different 
tiers of state expenditure are associated with economic growth; in other words, certain types of 
government expenditure are believed to spur economic growth while others are growth reducing. 
In this regard, government expenditure on investment, and total government expenditure have 
been found to be in a close positive association with economic growth in Kenya. However, when 
drawing summary of the study, he asserts that government consumption expenditure in Kenya 
tends to have mixed effects on economic growth. 
In U.S, Peden and Bradley (1989) also carried out a study about public expenditure. They sought 
to find out the linkage between the levels of public spending on gross domestic product using 
secondary data for the period 1949 to 1985. The results of their study show that the degree of 
state functions in the economy has a true negative influence on both the gross domestic product 
(GDP) and the economic growth rate (growth in gross domestic product). They, thus, concluded 
that the degree of public functions in the economy, beyond what is accepted as the optimal 
levels, resulted in reduced levels of GDP, reduced levels of economic growth, and a significant 
reduction in productivity.  
Njeru (2003) conducted a study on the effects of growth of foreign aid on public expenditure in 
Kenya over the period 1970-1999, used Heller’s utility (1975) model to investigate the 
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relationship between foreign aid and public spending. He presumed the idea that a recipient 
country’s aim is to maximize the social welfare in the face of budgetary constraints and would 
use aid inflows from overseas as an instrument in achieving their goals. The results of the study 
from ECM estimation model showed that there exists an important positive linkage between 
foreign aid and state spending. Njeru, further, notes the results of the study did agree with the 
findings of by other country-specific studies that on average, foreign aid leads to increased 
government spending.  
Another study was also done in 2001 by Fölster and Henrekson to establish the growth effects of 
public expenditure and revenue collection strategies among developed and developing countries. 
They limited their study to developed countries due to disparities in the structure of government 
spending between developed and less developed countries. Observing the period of study from 
1970 to 1995, they reveal that there was a strong negative link between public spending and 
gross domestic product and economic development. The growth effects of both public 
expenditure and taxation or revenue are very instrumental debates to most governments. It has 
also become central concern of many researchers. Kariuki (2003) studied the determinants of 
gross fixed capital formation in Kenya and found that increases in real interest rates do not deter 
private investment. Government expenditure was the most significant determinant of gross fixed 
capital formation. His study further reveals that monetary policy and output play a less 
significant role in explaining fixed capital formation, while FDI was very significant and 
strongly explain gross fixed capital formation in Kenya. 
According to Remmer (2004) and Sanz & Velzquez (2002), population dynamics like 
dependency ratio must be put into consideration when executing state expenditure plans because 
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certain categories of expenditure, especially medical care and social protection, seem to be in 
close association with the population fabrics of any economy. Again borrowing a leaf from 
previous studies, the relative size of state activities in an economy serves to include the effects of 
more seasonal factors, such as changes in the tax base and state non-tax revenues. It is also 
viewed that the size of the state is associated with factors that may affect the structure and 
composition of aggregate spending in public sector, which may include the level of corruption, 
exposure to international shocks such as trade risks, and internal shocks; like political instability 
and social feuds. 
Proponents of aid, according to Brautigam & Knack (2004),  advance the view that aid assists 
developing nations to ease compelling revenue requirements, build and improve local 
institutions, better labour compensation to government workers, assists in establishing poverty 
reducing programs, and increase the productivity and operations of states. On the contrary, 
according to Clements et al. (2004), increased aid inflows may enhance financial 
mismanagement by locals who have absolute interests and who are after tax evasions, which 
results in significant reduction in revenue collection.  Also, critics argue that aid may result to 
increases in government and private recurrent spending rather than capital accumulation, and 
therefore contributing proportionately less to the gross domestic product.  
Foye (2014) carried out a study to examine the determinants of government capital expenditure 
in Nigeria, using Error Correction Model and showed that real gross domestic product, public 
debt, trade openness, private expenditure, and foreign direct investment are among the aggregate 
determinants of government capital expenditure. Foye also noted that state expenditure on 
research and health enhances the productivity of labor and leads to effective management of the 
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economy. Thus, increased private participation in the economy is a telling sign to policy 
formulating agencies of increasing public spending on public investment (capital) spending. 
As Alesina and Tabellini (1990) explain, the growth of state borrowing is very in the structure of 
public fiscal policy. In their argument, debt overhang has a significant role to play in the 
allocation of the government budget and resource distribution in Nigeria. The researcher 
recognizes that this finding resonates well with the observations in the study done by Mahdavi 
(2004). Both studies affirm that foreign debt has a very fundamental role in the allocation of 
government budget and reveal that external borrowing affects the allocation of the government 
budget by raising some shares of the public budgetary plans while depriving other sectors. 
Further, this type of relation reflects a very important role for the state as an economy becomes 
more and more intricate and sophisticated. This complexity in economic activities causes the 
demand for public goods and social programs to increase significantly. On such basis, a thorough 
analysis of the different tiers of state expenditure should be done to track changes in the different 
structures of public spending as the role of the public sector in an economy increase in size and 
becomes more complex. Growth analysts have the view that, during the early stages of a 
country's economic progress, the state gets involved in almost in all aspects of the economy. 
However, government’s role begins to gradually diminish as a country's size of productive 
resources gradually increases while the private sector begins to expand. This happens as a result 
of state activities providing a conducive environment for private sector participation in the 
economy. Further, the public usually surrender particular sectors to private investors and focuses 
on the provision of pure public goods.  
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Abu (2004) sought to establish possible determinants of Jordanian state expenditure using co-
integration tests. He investigated the impact of a range of aggregate economic factors on 
government expenditure. The results of the study indicate that counter-cyclical policies, 
especially inflation, negatively influence growth in public expenditure. The results also show that 
population and unemployment are significantly associated with public expenditure in Jordan.  
Akanbi (2014) in his study of determinants of government expenditure in Nigeria explained that 
increased per capita income was found to be in support of Wagner’s law, given the response of 
total and capital expenditure, however, the law was refuted by the recurrent expenditure 
response. He continued to observe that prudent government spending results into a holistic and 
sustainable growth pattern, which serves as a management strategy for eradication of poverty and 
inequality within a society. Many states experience market imperfections during the process of 
production, and the only difference is the magnitude and the mode of manifestation. For such 
reasons, countries with high market distortions require a greater government involvement to put 
the economy in an equilibrium development path.  Thus, government spending is a key tool for 
managing demand and an important instrument for targeting long-term equilibrium growth and 
development. Aigbokhan (1997) studied the relationship between the level of state activity and 
gross domestic product for the period 1960 – 1993. Aigbokhan based his study on the impacts of 
structural adjustment programs (SAPs) that were institutionalized then in 1986 and his empiric 
finding suggests a two-directional correlation between total public spending and gross domestic 
product. Granger causality tests  results for the study reveal that state spending and gross 
domestic product are not co-integrated and could not be used to predict an equilibrium 
relationship for the two variables. Second, causality tests carried out confirm that state spending 
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is not related to continued increase in state revenues and that there exists no any possibility of 
response of state revenue to state spending. 
Adam (2003) study on external debt, economic growth and poverty eradication in Sub-Saharan 
Africa assumed a neoclassical production function using cointegration Error-Correction 
technique in testing the short-run dynamics and long run equilibrium relationships. He used 
simultaneous model of analysis to capture the complex and the indirect relationships between the 
variables. The results revealed that GDP had unexpected significant reverse association with 
public spending on social goods and services which were not enough to trigger growth in Sub-
Saharan Africa economies. 
Gross national product is expected to have a positive relation with public expenditure and also as 
Shonchoy (2010) observes that lagged increase in per capita income (real GDP) increases 
government final consumption expenditure. He continues to explain that as GDP increases, 
future consumption expenditure is bound to increase. However, budget deficit poses restraints on 
the side of the government to increase expenses and it can, therefore, be negatively related to 
public spending. 
Aregbeyen (2006) used Johansen co-integration and Granger causality testing procedure to 
establish causality between gross national income and aggregate state spending in Nigeria and 
the results reveal a unidirectional causality from gross domestic product to aggregate state 
expenditure in Nigeria, thereby verifying and holding Wagner’s concepts of increasing state 
activities due to increases in public revenues. Further, Aregbeyen, from his study, reveals that 
there is no existence of a bi-directional causal relationship between productive public 
expenditure and gross domestic product in Nigeria. However, the causality from gross national 
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domestic to productive government spending was established to be more significant than the 
reverse direction after variance analysis test technique had been carried out. Babatunde (2011) 
examined the validity of Wagners Law and tested it using yearly time series for the period 1970 
– 2006 in Nigeria. He adopted the Bounds Test technique together with Unrestricted Error 
Correction Model and Granger causality tests. Results of the Bounds Test reveal that there 
existed no equilibrium connection between state spending and output in Nigeria. 
Aladejare (2013) sought to examine the effects of state spending on gross national income from 
1961 to 2010 in Nigeria using Vector Error Correction Model and Granger Causality Approach.  
He concluded that there is truth in the Wagner’s hypothesis that increases in GDP lead to 
increases in aggregate government expenditure in the Nigerian economy. Aladejare continues to 
observe that the causal effect of gross domestic product on state investment spending has a 
stronger significance in comparison to state consumption spending in Nigeria. Intuitively, 
increases in gross domestic product lead to more increases in capital expenditure than the 
increases in consumption expenditure in Nigeria. Olopade B. and Olopade D. (2010), examined 
how expenditure and monetary policies affect the growth rate of an economy and development in 
Nigeria, and their study reveals that there was no significant association of many of the 
categories of government spending under the study with gross domestic product and the GDP. 
The regression coefficient of their study, however, show mixed influences on economic growth 
and development with some being weekly significant. The variations in significance levels 
exhibited by the estimates were significant due to the exclusion effects of environmental impacts. 
In Nigeria, Aruwa (2010) conducted a study on state spending in relation to economic progress 
and predicts that the growth in state spending and the manner in which it increases in growth is 
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largely due to increased demand in social security and social protection rather than investment, 
and the state is reduced to a less active role as tool for making crucial decisions during fiscal 
policy formulation. It is widely argued that, for a fiscal policy to yield a long-term economic 
performance, there is need to improve human capital and that a good proportion of public 
expenditure should be directed towards investing more on the stock of labour. Sound balance 
between state expenditure categories contribute to proper distribution of resources in an economy 
and have all the capabilities to enhance development. Notable growth improving public 
expenditure categories include expenditures on areas such as  infrastructural development, quest 
and development of new knowledge, education, and health and, if possible, must at all times 
remain the priority of state’s  spending authority because provisions for more productive than for 
protective expenditures is essential for government budgetary and financial administration 
strategies.  
Advocates of foreign aid assert that apart from providing urgent cover to disastrous situations, its 
main purpose is to help create enabling and fertile grounds for sustainable economic 
development. According to Sturm (2001), donations are usually limited to particular purposes 
that they have been requisitioned for, for example, putting up roads, and in this respect foreign 
aid is expected to be negatively related to government consumption expenditure. Some 
proponents of foreign aid hypothesize that the assistance helps developing nations to relieve 
compelling income requirements, improve local institutions,   pay good salaries to government 
workers, help in establishing poverty reducing programs and improve the operations of the 
government. Conversely, critics argue that larger amounts of inflows might promote financial 
mismanagement behavior by people who safeguard their interests and who are after evading 
taxes, which leads to a decline in revenue. According to McGillivray and Morrissey (2001), 
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foreign aid affects government fiscal items on two accounts of disincentives: First, aid creates 
tax displacement effects which consequently lower the government incentives to increase taxes 
and revenues. Second, it might not be channeled into productive areas resulting in a phenomenon 
known as aid fungibility. Further, Please (1997) and Papanek (1973) agree that financial support 
can lead to increases in the level of public and private expenses rather than saving and capital 
accumulation, yielding less to the economy. Cameron (1978) observes that countries with higher 
degree of openness of the economy, usually, are more exposed to foreign competition and 
compete for business space by providing, among other things, adequate infrastructure. He 
continues to affirm that in order to attract foreign direct investment the government could 
increase public capital spending, and as such, nations with higher degree of trade openness 
experience higher increments in government spending.  
Government budget deficit usually raises external government debt through foreign borrowing, 
which encourages budgetary over-estimation. There are costs associated with public debt; 
recipient countries have to incur debt repayment and debt administration costs, which are 
additional budgetary constraints. Most developing countries are heavily indebted and face 
serious fiscal challenges. In prescribing solutions to the problem, such countries should make 
efforts to cut on indebtedness which could have a corresponding cut on their expenditures, 
especially for the consumption of their population. According to Oxley and Martin (1991), 
monstrous proportion of budget deficits and government debt can result in restraining fiscal 
policy measures. They further assert that high debt payment costs wipe out other groups of 
public spending and that during periods of financial stringency; it is politically true that it is quite 
easier to suspend capital expenditures than it is to delay consumption spending. In most cases, it 
is notable that during times of fiscal stringency and financial consolidation, state capital 
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expenditure is an easy expenditure group to delay, suspend or even cut. This is a very usual 
behavior because investment expenditure is quite flexible and during times of restrictive 
economic policies and financial stringency, it is the first category of government expenditure to 
be reduced given that they are the most flexible component of costs.    
Schuknecht (1999) examined fiscal policies regiment and seasonal exchange rates surrounding 
electoral periods in 25 developing nations and found that the macroeconomic factor of trade 
openness, proxied by the ration of the sum of imports and exports to gross domestic product, 
showed a positive impact on the aggregate budget balances as was previously envisaged by the 
study. However, the effect was not significant at conventional levels. Alesina et al. (1999) 
studied the influence of trade openness on financial performance and found that trade openness is 
not always a necessity to economic growth in Latin America.   
Omar (1990) explains the relationship between growth of public expenditure and bureaucracy in 
Kuwait using panel data between the years 1975 to 1985. The study tries to examine the impact 
of certain macro and micro factors on public expenditure through statistical analysis and shows 
that there is a very concrete positive link between state expenditure and individual 
microeconomic variables such as expansion of education and provision of health services. 
Besides, Omar also found existence of a positive correlation between state expenditure and such 
aggregate economic variables as gross domestic product and demographic changes.  
Ansari et al. (1997) also sought to establish the link between public spending and state revenue 
among some selected countries in African; Ghana, Kenya, and the Republic of South Africa for 
the period 1957-1990, using Granger test procedures and also by using the causality test 
approach developed by Holmes and Hutton in 1990. The study reveals that in Ghana, Kenya, and 
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South Africa there was no significant link which existed between public expenditure and gross 
national income over the study period.  Ezirim and Muoghalu (2006) also explain the correlation 
between public expenditure and its causes in less developed countries and concluded that the 
coefficients of both debt overhang and debt burden constitute fundamental factors which explain 
changes in state expenditure in a practical situation of a developing country.  
2.2.2 Structural Variables 
In this category, the study considered demographic factors such urbanization, young population 
and old population. According to Lybeck (1988), most studies explaining government size 
usually include the structural variables to test for Wagner's hypothesis, particularly in the manner 
that emphasizes the gradual change of the local villages into industrialized societies with their 
change of services like mode of dressing, building designs, education, eating habits and health 
care from basic unit of life all the way to a giant public sector. The inclusion of the urbanization 
level in most models pre-empts a positive relationship with government consumption 
expenditure. Public capital spending, especially on infrastructure, is generally needed more in 
rural areas than in industrialized areas since a great deal of foundation work still need to be 
carried out. A larger degree of urbanization can lead to less demand for infrastructure and greater 
demand for services, and this could lead to higher tendencies of incurring greater proportions of 
recurrent expenditure. An inference to population distribution can be crucial in explaining and 
tracking changes in internal structure of government budget. As a way of example, a country 
whose population consists of people of minority ages implies that the public would be forced to 
channel more budget provisions to: education to put in place all the required educational 
resources; health to give provide remedy to basic health care, and food. Conversely, a high 
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proportion of the population falling within the conventional aging bracket would require a shift 
of the budgetary policies to the social services to provide a cover and security for old age in 
terms pension schemes and grants. 
Similarly, a growing population might increase demand, and lead to increase in government 
consumption spending. A nation with a highly scattered population in terms ethnic of 
fragmentation may find it hard to reach a consensus on state expenditure and operational policies 
because ethnically polarized society weakens the centralized control of the government. Person 
et al. (1997) and Mau (1995) also argue that ethnic polarization undermines the checks and 
balances and encourages rent-seeking behavior. Easterly and Levine (1997) also discovered a 
significant negative association between ethnic diversity of nations and their state expenditure. 
Heller and Diamond (1990) made an in depth study on the relationship between demographic 
factors and public expenditure and observed that, in addition to its size, the rapidity of its 
increase, age structure, and the geographical distribution of population all explain possible 
increases in public expenditure. They continued to show that as social needs of a society, e.g. 
expansion of education and health services, expand and increase in complexity there is a greater 
need for state interventions to provide for such services. According to them, demographic 
influences such as increase in population growth rate and increase in population density exert 
pressure on the available state resources, and it becomes the duty of the state to ensure that 
adequate services are availed to citizens. In a bid to do this, the state increases its resource 
employment to increase productivity of goods and services needed by the people.  
Ekpo (1995) also attempted to examine determinants of government expenditure and 
demonstrates that ideology, bureaucratic controls, demographic changes, increased cost of state 
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production and foreign aid inflows are significant in providing explanations to continued 
increase in government spending.  
Okafor and Eiya (2011) sought to establish the macroeconomic determinants of growth in public 
spending in Nigeria for the period 1999 - 2008 using OLS regression technique and concluded 
that: population, public debt and tax revenue had a strong significant positive association with 
total public expenditure. However, their study reveals that the link between inflation and state 
expenditure is quite robust and also that the two variables are negatively correlated. The finding 
agrees with Musgrave’s tax and spend hypothesis. Taxes are the major sources of state revenue 
and they can either be expansionary, that is improving the GDP and increasing employment or 
contractionary. Expansionary fiscal policy targets increase capital injection into the different 
sectors of the economy, both productively and unproductively, with a view to creating equity in 
resource allocation, tackling poverty, creating employment to the people and bringing 
sustainable development. 
Adetomobi J. and Ayanwale A. (2006) explored possible relationship between education 
expenditure trends, student enrolment in universities and other higher learning institutions, 
unemployment and gross domestic product in Nigeria. The results of their study indicate that 
state spending is unstable and cannot be predicted, with investment and consumption spending of 
the Nigerian government since 1970 because they form only tiny fractions of the nation's budget. 
Further, total student enrollment in institutions of higher learning contrasts sharply with level of 
employment in the case of Nigeria.  
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2.2.3 Politico-institutional Variables 
Political regimes and political structures tend to influence expenditure components of a state. 
According to Cameron (1978), Socialist governments seem to realize larger state investment 
more rapidly than conservative states. Grilli et al. (1991) report that the type of state, (coalition, 
majority government or minority government), can affect both public debt overhang and the 
level of public expenditure. This happens because higher degree of political inclusivity and 
minority states can possibly have greater challenges in reaching consensual agreement and come 
up with a balanced budget. In cases of this kind, public capital expenditure category more often 
than not becomes an easier target to sacrifice. Nonetheless, multiparty democracy may enhance 
the possibility that a consensus between a party and another group with vested interest is made. 
Henrekson concludes from the results of his model for the Swedish government, which resonates 
well with the views of Roubini and Sachs, that states which are politically less strong are often 
forced to increase consumption expenditure than are for politically stronger states.  
Nordhaus (1975), Dalen and Swank (1995) carried out a study in Netherlands and discovered 
that elections are significant in providing explanations to infrastructural expenditure. Schuknecht 
(2000) also observes that, in the study conducted among 24 developing countries, government 
capital expenditure is used as a tool to influence electoral decisions. Besides, Bates (1988) and 
Krueger (1993) reveal that government capital expenditure and political seasons are cointegrated, 
and it has been a common and widely practiced in countries like Zambia and Turkey. Economic 
and political liberalizations might provide an enabling environment to the private sector and 
cause the government to retract. 
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Kanano (2006) used OLS estimation techniques to study the determinants of public expenditure 
in Kenya using time series data for the period 1980 - 2004. He analyzed the impacts of 
government budgetary resource composition on public expenditure growth over the study period, 
and the results show that private debt significantly explains public expenditure growth in Kenya. 
Further, his study also finds validity in Wagner’s hypothesis and reveals a strong positive 
relationship between government revenue and public expenditure in Kenya. His finding is 
consistent with the results published from studies done by Aladjare (2013) and Babatunde (2011) 
which indicate that increases in a state's rich resource base increase its spending capacity.  
According to Nyamongo & Schoeman (2007), size of the public can be proxied by the ratio of 
state expenditure to gross domestic product to measure how much the government activity is 
responsible for the changes in the economy. 
Kirori and Ali (1965) studied the macroeconomic implication in Kenya and the results of their 
study show that demographic changes in real per capita income, relative price of public to private 
good, internal debt obligation and rate of urbanization influence growth of some government 
expenditure categories in Kenya.  
Ndung’u (1995) used multivariate Granger causality test to examine the correlation between 
budget deficit, upsurge in the general price level and growth of money supply on the one side; 
and money printing and inflation rate on the contrary. The results of his study show that budget 
deficit affects monetary growth and, that there are both direct and indirect links between money 
printing and inflation in Kenya. The study identified factors such as high population growth rate, 
public sector over employment, interest rate on domestic on domestic and foreign debts and 
narrow tax base as the major causes of growth public expenditure. Ndung’u, however, does not 
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establish any link between the variables of interest and the components of government spending, 
that is, either investment spending or consumption spending. He concluded that debt 
management has always become a nightmare to many state planners in Kenya and affects 
allocation of resources in the government budget.  
Mosoti (2014) explains the causes of the growth of public expenditure in Kenya over the period 
1980 to 2012. He used Ordinary Least Squares to find a possible links between the explanatory 
and the dependent variables, and also employed co-integration tests to examine the degree of 
association between the independent variables themselves. He concluded that, in Kenya, 
Population, GDP, and coalition government show a strong significant relationship with public 
expenditure in the long run. The study also shows that population and GDP have a positive 
correlation with public expenditure growth while coalition government and free primary 
education have a negative effect on public expenditure growth in Kenya. The study further 
reveals that foreign aid and inflation remain insignificant in explaining the growth of public 
expenditure.  
Muyambiri et al. (2010) investigated the link between state and private investment spending for 
Zimbabwe, using the Accelerator model and tested Pairwise Granger causality, and the results 
show that private expenditure granger causes government capital expenditure. They also noted 
that political factors rather than the economic factors alone significantly affect the government 
spending among many countries. For instance, Nadler and Hong (2011) carried out a study on 
how political and institutional factors have impacted on the U.S. budgetary items, using standard 
multiple regression techniques, the results of their study reveal that considering a range of 
economic factors, a greater public sector union membership, effective collective bargaining 
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rights and unyielding democratic orientation of the law making organ of the state are linked with 
increased yields, having the implication of higher risks of non-compliance. They also showed 
that all other things held constant, governments with weaker coalitions, weaker collective 
bargaining powers, and fewer left-leaning government lawmakers pay less in borrowing costs at 
the same levels of debt and similar levels of unplanned budget deficits than do governments with 
stronger coalitions and more left-leaning lawmakers. 
In 2015, Hong and Nadler conducted a study to examine whether political and institutional 
factors are germane in explaining how the U.S. budgetary variables are impacted on. Among 
their findings is the fact that a strong democratic environment and focus in the government law 
making organs is significantly related to increases in the perceived risk of the government. The 
findings, in addition, reveal that, controlling for a range of economic factors, greater proportion 
of public sector coalition membership, lack of guaranteed rights to labour laws, and effective 
collective bargaining powers are strongly related to rise in the perceived risk of the government 
and that the right to strike does not have any significant influence on public bond yields. Also, 
Hong (2015) investigated the effect of budgetary rules on the U.S. budgetary outcome and 
whether the effects were related to political and economic factors. He also revealed that balanced 
budget rule is a critical environment for fiscal policy outcome. He further advanceed that the 
effect of budget rules depends significantly on political factors, particularly on the party identity 
of the head of the executive, that budgetary rules are much more binding when the governor is a 
Republican, but the identity of the party controlling the government lawmaking organs do not 
have a significant effect. He further elucidated that the effect of budget rules also depend on 
whether the state is divided. Budgetary rules are less binding in undivided state, in which one 
party controls the executive, and another controls the legislature, while the effect of the rules are 
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greatly unaffected under divided lawmakers, in which different parties control each legislative 
chamber. 
Edame (2014) studied the determinants of public infrastructure spending in Nigeria, using ECM. 
He also discovered that the rate of urbanization, public revenue, population density, external 
reserves, and type of government jointly or individually affect public spending on infrastructure 
in Nigeria. Aregbeyen and Akpan (2013) conducted a study on the long-term determinants of 
public expenditure in Nigeria, using a microeconomic analysis. In their study, Akpan argue: that 
foreign aid is significantly and positively influence consumption expenditure at the expense of 
capital expenditure; that revenue is also positively related to public expenditure, that trade 
openness  negatively affect public expenditure; that debt service obligation negatively affect all 
the categories of public spending in the long run; that the greater the size of the urban 
population; the greater would be public consumption spending on economic environments; that 
Federal government  expenditure is biased towards consumption expenditure, which increases 
significantly during an election period than would otherwise be the case. Similarly, Adebayo et 
al. (2014) examined the influence of state expenses on industrial growth of Nigeria via co-
integration and causality and found that public expenditure on administration, production of 
services, and redistribution of resources showed a negative equilibrium correlation with growth 
in industrial sector in Nigeria while public expenditure on social amenities has a positive 
equilibrium correlation. Thus, they concluded that there was no crowding-out effect. From these 
studies reviewed, there is evidence that all the studies combined economic, social, and political 
determinants of government expenditure in Nigeria. 
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Shonchoy ((2010) used random effect model to investigating the causes of state consumption 
expenditure among 111l developing countries and found that political and institutional qualities 
and leadership regime, strongly influence state consumption spending. It found that authoritarian 
governments are more accommodative towards consumption expenditure. On the contrary, 
Shonchoy (2010) found corruption, size of the GDP and ethnicity to have a strong negative 
correlation with public spending. The paper focuses on the recent pattern of government 
consumption expenditure in developing countries with emphasis on political, institutional and 
governance variables. Using a panel data set for 97 developing countries from 1984 to 2004, he 
found evidence that political and institutional variables as well as governance variables 
signiﬁcantly inﬂuence and shape the government expenditure. Political institutional variables 
such as political ruling, political power in the parliament as well as governance variables such as 
corruption and government effectiveness are found to have signiﬁcant statistical association with 
government expenditure. In addition, the study ﬁnds evidence that public expenditure 
signiﬁcantly shrinks under military dictator- ship compared with other forms of governance. 
Kilinga (2015) studied the determinants of county government capital expenditure using cross-se 
tion data for the 2013/2014 budget period in Kenya. The findings of this study indicated that 
wage bill had a negative statistically significant relationship with capital expenditure. The 
findings also indicated that local revenue performance had a positive and significant relationship 
with capital expenditure. A unit increase in local revenue performance caused a variation of 
3.550541 units in capital expenditure. Based on the findings of his study, he concluded that wage 
bill and local revenue performance, were key determinants of capital expenditure by county 
governments in Kenya and recommended that county should keep the wage bill at sustainable 
level to create more resources for capital programmes. He further suggested that counties should 
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invest in integrated revenue collection and management systems to seal revenue leakages. 
County government should also improve administrative procedures of tax collection and invest 
in untapped sources to improve local revenue collection.   
Oketch T. O. and Linge T. (2018) investigated the determinants of recurrent public expenditures 
in Kenya with interest on salaries, social contribution and non-wage related variables such as 
rent & utilities, travelling expenses, hospitality and other consumables using error correction 
model and found that there was significant increase in recurrent expenditure during 2010/11 
financial year. They also observed that all the variables; salaries, wages and social contribution, 
rent and utilities, pension, travelling, foreign trips, consumables (snacks, teas), trainings and 
hospitality except office and general supplies significantly affect recurrent spending in Kenya.    
According to the report by Transparency International (2016), corruption in African states is on 
the rise and the respective leaders are to blame for not putting in place the necessary measures to 
strengthen their institutions. Mauro (1998) observe that politicians tend to allocate resources in 
areas where it would be quite easy for them to get large bribes and still keep them secret. He 
continues to explain that democracy improves efficiency in allocation of resources since 
politicians can only increase their chances of re-election when they become accountable to the 
electorates for the expenses that they incurred. 
2.4 Summary of Literature Review  
The main objective of government expenditure is to stimulate economic growth and development 
of a country. However, rapidly growing government consumption expenditure is said to have a 
retarding effect on economic growth (Aladjare, 2013). Little literature exists on government 
consumption expenditure in the world over and Kenya in particular.  Mosoti (2014) and Kanano 
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(2006), on one hand, elaborated the reasons for growth of public expenditure in Kenya, while 
Maingi (2010) found evidence on the effects of government consumption expenditure on 
economic growth in Kenya and concluded that its growth retarding.. However, their studies did 
not examine the reasons for continued growth in consumption expenditure in Kenya. Shonchoy 
(2010) detailed the causes of growth in consumption expenditure among developing countries 
but this study finds that following the shortcomings panel analysis, the findings may not address 
the specific issues affecting Kenya (Levine and Renelt, 1992; Sala-i-Martin et al., 2003) and it is 
not always informative for a particular country (Harrison, 1996; Durlauf, 2002; Hoeffler, 2002).  
Oketch T. O. and Linge T. (2018) illustrated the determinants of recurrent public expenditures in 
Kenya with focus on microeconomic factors covering issues such as salaries/wages, social 
contribution and non-wage related variables such as rent & utilities, travelling expenses, 
hospitality and other consumables. It is noteworthy that this study differs from theirs in terms of 
focus. Their study focused on the microeconomic determinants as opposed to macroeconomic 
determinants which are at  the centre of this study. It is evident from the literature review that 
public consumption expenditure seems to be influenced by national income, population, inflation 
and foreign aid, urbanization, governance and foreign direct investment.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents both conceptual and theoretical frameworks within which the study was 
formulated. It also discusses the models used in the study, data types, sources of data, and data 
analysis techniques employed in this study.  
3.2 Research Design 
The purpose of this study was to examine the determinants of government consumption 
expenditure in Kenya. The study applied quantitative approaches to in order to achieve the 
research objectives. The study was a non-experimental research in which a range of variables 
were measured and adopted correlational studies design, since correlation was used in the 
analysis. The study used data for the period 1963-2017 for the following set of variables: 
economic variables; gross domestic product, foreign aid, inflation, foreign direct investment, 
interest rate, trade openness and external debt stock; Structural variables; urbanization rate, 
young population and old population and finally Politico-institutional variables; market 
liberalization, political liberty, political instability, corruption and elections. The study used 
published data from World Bank Country Data Portal (2018) and UNCTAD, Country 
Development Index (2018). The collected data was analysed using Stata and Gretl econometric 
softwares. The systems of equations were estimated using VECM, VAR and OLS after carrying 
out time series property tests on the data. 
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3.2 Conceptual Framework  
The study was guided by three objectives and each objective was modelled separately giving rise 
to three systems of equations in the study. Three categories of variables were adopted: economic 
variables; gross domestic product, foreign aid, inflation, foreign direct investment, interest rate, 
trade openness and external debt stock; Structural variables; urbanization rate, young population 
and old population and finally Politico-institutional variables; market liberalization, political 
liberty, political instability, corruption and elections. 
The conceptual framework shows the linkage between independent variables and the dependent 
variable. The independent variables include economic, structural and political-institutional 
factors while government consumption expenditure is the dependent variable, as shown in Figure 
9.  
             Independent Variables                                                                                                
                                                                   
                                                                                 
 
                                                                                                                 Dependent variable 
 
 
 
 
                Figure 9: Conceptual Framework 
               Source: Author, 2018 
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3.3 Theoretical Framework 
This study adopted public choice approach similar to that used by Hewitt (1991, 1992, 1993), 
Davoodi et.al (2001), Nyamongo (2007) and Akanbi and Schoeman (2010). The model analyses 
the relationship between government capital (infrastructure) spending, recurrent spending and 
overall government spending. Akanbi (2014) observes that previous studies mostly used the 
public choice model to examine the link between military spending and overall government 
spending, where military spending is considered as pure public good. Akanbi and Schoeman 
(2010) slightly deviated from this model where they explored the relationship between education 
spending and overall government. Akanbi (2014) further deviated from all the aforementioned 
studies by disaggregating capital and recurrent expenditure from overall government 
expenditure. Following the foregoing, this study disaggregated government consumption 
spending from total government expenditure and thus, the determination of consumption 
expenditure is modelled as a government optimization problem, meaning that the decision on the 
component of a budget for consumption expenditure is taken by the executive wings of the 
government. 
Assuming the welfare function of the government to be as follows: W = f (P, C, R, and Z)... (3.1) 
Where P = private consumption; C = government capital spending; R = government recurrent 
spending; and Z = state variables (i.e. GDP per capita, government revenue, governance index, 
population and urbanisation index, etc.) The government’s decision of the level of recurrent and 
overall government spending is affected by the state variables. Overall government spending is 
represented by the following equation: G = C + R. …………………………………………. (3.2) 
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 Abstracting from private investment and the external account, the budget constraint is 
determined by the available resources in the economy: G = Y – P……………………..…… (3.3)  
Where, Y represents the value of gross domestic product. In order to obtain a simple analytical 
solution, a Cobb-Douglas specification for equation (3.1) is considered, while abstracting from 
the presence of state variables. Thus, 
……………………………...…………………………………………………. (3.4) 
Choices of G, C and R that maximise equation (3.4) subject to equations (3.2) and (3.3) will 
result in:  
……………………………………………………………………………... (3.5) 
…………..………………………………………………………………………. (3.6) 
 …………………………………………………………………………………. (3.7) 
Equations (3.5), (3.6) and (3.7) show the simultaneous relationship between the two categories of 
spending and overall government spending. Higher capital and recurrent spending will lead to 
higher overall spending and vice versa. Allowing for the state variables to enter the equations, 
results in the following equations:   
G = f1(C, R, Z)……………………………………………………………………………….. (3.8)       
C = f2(G, Z)………………………………………………………………………………..…. (3.9) 
R =f3(G, Z)………………………………………………………………………………….  (3.10)  
Equations (3.8), (3.9) and (3.10) form a structural model.  In line with the specification of this 
study, equation (3.10) becomes the model of interest to this study showing that recurrent 
expenditure R is function of total government expenditure G plus other state variables Z such as 
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population, inflation, gross domestic product, trade openness, etc., which are assumed to 
influence different categories of government expenditure. 
3.4 The Empirical Models 
This study used three models that take the lead from Hewitt (1991, 1992, and 1993), Davoodi 
et.al (2001), Nyamongo (2007), Akanbi and Schoeman (2010), Mosoti (2014) and Akanbi 
(2014). The three models; Economic model, Structural model and Politico-institutional model, 
were specified as follows: 
3.4.1 Economic Model 
This system of equation consists of variables with cyclical behaviour and comprised of the 
following: gross domestic product, foreign aid, inflation rate, foreign direct investment, interest 
rate, trade openness and external debt stock. Thus, equation of the economic determinants was 
set as follows: 
GC = β0 + β1GDP + β2FA + β3INF + β4FDI + β5INT + β6TRO + β6DEBT+ 
μ………………………………………………………………………………………….… (3.11)  
where:  
GC is real government consumption expenditure; GDP is real Gross Domestic Product; FA is 
Foreign Aid; INF is Inflation rate; FDI is foreign direct investment; INT is interest rate; TRO is 
trade openness; DEBT is external debt stock; β0, β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6 are the coefficients or 
parameters are estimators, and μ is a random error term, assumed to be normally distributed with 
a zero expected value (or mean). 
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3.4.2 Structural Model 
In this system, demographic factors were considered and they included urbanization rate, young 
population and old population. The model was therefore specified as follows: 
GC = β0 + β1URB + β2YOUNG + β3OLD + μ ………………………….…………………. (3.12)  
Where: 
GC is real government consumption expenditure; URB is urbanization rate; YOUNG is young 
population below 15 years; OLD is old population above 64 years; β0, β1, β2, β3 are the 
coefficients or parameters are estimators, and μ is a random error term, assumed to be normally 
distributed with a zero expected value (or mean). 
3.4.3 Politico-institutional Model 
In this model, issues related to politics and governance were taken into account. It consists of six 
sets of dummy variables: market liberation, political liberty, political instability, election periods 
and corruption. The equation for this system was then set as follows: 
GC = β0 + β1SAP + β2DEMOC + β3WAR + β4ELECT + β5COR + μ ………………….…. (3.13) 
Where: GC is real government consumption expenditure; SAP is structural adjustment programs 
which takes a value of 1 for presence and 0 otherwise; DEMOC is political liberty which takes a 
value of 1 for presence and 0 otherwise; WAR is political instability which takes a value of 1 for 
presence and 0 otherwise; ELECT is elections which takes a value of 1 for presence and 0 
otherwise; COR is corruption which takes a value of 1 for presence and 0 otherwise; β0, β1, β2, 
β3, β4, β5, are the coefficients or parameters are estimators, and μ is a random error term, 
assumed to be normally distributed with a zero expected value (or mean). 
59 
 
This study used OLS estimator to examine the determinants of government consumption 
spending in Kenya using time series data between the years 1963 to 2017. The classical linear 
regression model assumes that each error term is normally distributed, that is, it has zero mean 
and constant variance. As such, this study verified normality assumption using Darling Anderson 
and Quantile – Quantile plot and the test output conformed to the premise of Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) method of normal linear distribution, Best Linear Unbiased Estimators (BLUE). 
3.4 Definition and Measurement of Variables  
The variables of the study are defined, and their measurements, as well as their expected signs, 
are indicated (see Table A1).  
Table A1: Definition and Measurement of Variables 
Variable Definition Measurement Effect 
Trade Openness The degree of capital and current 
account openness due to Chinn 
and Ito (2007). 
The ratio of import prices to 
export prices  
0 
Inflation  
 
The rate at which the market 
price level of goods and services 
rises.   
It is measured as percentage 
change in CPI Index. 
+ve 
Gross Domestic 
Product  
 
It is the total value of all goods 
and services produced over a 
specific time period in a country.  
Measured using real GDP 
values reported in various 
statistical abstracts in USD 
thousands. 
+ve 
Young Population  
 
The number of people below 15 
years in a geographic area at a 
particular period in time.  
Measured in millions of 
people. 
+ve 
Old Population  
 
The number of people above 64 
years in a geographic area at a 
Measured in millions of 
people. 
+ve 
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particular period in time.  
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
 
This refers to the investments 
undertaken in a country by non-
citizen investors.  
Annual FDI inflows in USD 
‘thousands’ at current prices.  
    0 
 
Market 
Liberalization 
 
This is the extent of control of 
economic activities by the 
government in an economy.  
It is represented by the 
dummy variable, SAPs. 
0 
Government 
Final 
Consumption 
Expenditure  
 
It refers to the current 
expenditure by general 
government bodies on services 
such as defense, education, 
public order, road maintenance, 
wages, and salaries. 
Government annual current 
expenditure outlays in USD 
‘thousands’ at current prices. 
 
 
0 
External Debt 
Stock 
 
Public guaranteed long-term 
debt owed to non-residents. 
Country public debt 
outstanding and disbursed in 
USD ‘thousands’ at current 
prices. 
+ 
Foreign Aid  
 
An outright grant, not long-term 
lending for non-military 
purposes, by governments and 
international organizations, to 
generate some benefits to the 
recipient country.  
Country foreign aid inflows 
in USD ‘thousands’ at current 
prices. 
 
  
+ 
Political Cycles 
It represents the changes in the 
leadership of a country.  
It is proxied by election 
dummy variable. 
    0 
Political Liberty 
It captures periods of political 
freedom. 
It is represented by dummy 
variables; multi-partism, 
coalition and devolved 
governments in Kenya which 
    0 
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take a value of 1 or 0 
otherwise. 
Political 
Instability 
 
This is the degree of peace and 
harmony that exist in a country.  
Periods of upheavals and 
wars in Kenya between 1963 
and 2014, with 1982/1983 
and 2007/2008 being the 
periods of interest. It will 
assume a value of 1 or 0 
otherwise. 
    0 
Corruption  
 
Corruption is understood to be 
the abuse of public office for 
private gains, whether material 
or political.  
World country's Corruption 
perception index.  
 
     + 
Interest Rate 
Payment 
 
It is the proportion of amount 
borrowed paid number of times 
per period for all periods during 
the total term of the loan usually 
one year.   
Commercial banks’ lending 
rates in percentages 
 
       0 
Urbanization 
 
Transformation of families to 
villages and villages to modern 
societies defines urbanization.  
 
Proxied by the proportion of 
the population living in the 
urban centres at any time. 
         + 
Source: Author, 2018 
3.5 Data Sources and Time Series Properties 
This study has used secondary data extracted from Annual Statistical Abstracts for the period 
1963 to 2017, both from the Ministry of Finance and the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics. 
Statistical information on expenditure was obtained from the Ministry of Finance in Kenya, and 
information on GDP was obtained from the Kenya Nation Bureau of Statistics. Nominal values 
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from statistical Abstracts were obtained from World Bank, Country Data Portal (2018) and 
UNCTAD, Country Development Index (2018).  Two deflators were used in this study; the CPI 
and GDP deflator. This study adopted 2010 indices as the base year for all the deflated values. 
Expenditure data at current prices were obtained by deflating the nominal expenditure data using 
the CPI. GDP deflator was used to convert GDP data to real GDP values. Real GDP is the 
percentage ratio of nominal GDP to the GDP deflator.  
3.6 Time Series Properties 
This section examines the properties exhibited by the time series data used in the study. 
Therefore, stationarity, causality, cointegration, normality and diagnostic tests were the issues to 
be established.  
3.6.1 Augmented Dickey–Fuller Test 
Macroeconomic variables specified in the model were assumed to have a unit root (that is the 
absence of stationarity). Generally, when testing for unit root in large samples, the ADF Test is 
preferred. The main reason for using ADFT is that it removes serial correlation. As a practice in 
econometrics, non-stationary data are not predictable and should not be used in the formulation 
of a model because results yielded using a nonstationary time series can be misleading. 
Therefore, for consistency purposes and the need for reliable results, the nonstationary time 
series needs to be changed into stationary data. While a nonstationary process has a variance and 
an expected value that does not converge or returns to an equilibrium expected value over time, a 
stationary process revolves around a constant equilibrium expected value and has a constant 
variance which does not depend on time.   
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A stochastic variable Y is said to exhibit a random walk without a drift if its value at a time, t, 
can be mathematically expressed as the sum of its value at a time, t-1, and a random shock, or 
white noise, (with zero mean and constant variance):  
Yt = β0 +Yρt-1 + εt,…………………………………………...……………………………. (3.14)  
where ρ is the constant term.  
According to Gujarati (2004), If ρ=1, the random walk test gives rise to a unit root process. The 
Dicky and Fuller (1979) and the Augmented Dickey and Fuller methodologies are the commonly 
used techniques in testing for the presence of unit root. Considering the first order autoregressive 
process, the two tests are mathematically differentiated as follows:  
Yt = β0 +ρYt-1 + εt, -1 ≤ ρ ≤1......................................................................................………. (3.15)  
Eliminating Yt-1 from the left hand side of equation 3.14 above gives the first difference form of 
the random walk model:  
Yt-Yt-1 = β0+ ρYt-1 + εt- Yt-1 .......................................................................………………… (3.16) 
ΔYt = β0 +(ρ-1) Yt-1 + εt = β0+ α Yt-1 + εt................................................................................ (3.17)  
Where ΔYt = Yt-Yt-1 is the value after first differencing of the random variable Y at time t; α= ρ-
1 and εt is white noise at time t. Equation (3.17) is restricted since it ignores possible presence of 
a constant term that may cause the series Yt to drift away from the origin. Thus, introducing a 
constant term gives random walk model with a drift:  
ΔYt = β0 +αYt-1+ εt…………………………………….……...………...………………….. (3.18)  
In each of the equations above, ADF procedure tests the null hypothesis that α = 0, that is ρ = 1 
against the alternate that α < 0, that is ρ < 1. Rejection of the null hypothesis implies that the 
series is stationary. In the case where the null hypothesis is not rejected, the conclusion is that the 
series has a unit root and it means that it is not- stationary. Therefore, the null hypothesis that ρ = 
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1 is tested using the τ (tau) statistic, whose critical values were developed by Dicky Fuller 
(1979). If the test statistics results indicate a figure that is greater than the ADF critical values, 
the null hypothesis that the series does not exhibit a unit root is accepted, and the conclusion is 
that the series is non stationary. However, if the test statistics results show a figure that is less 
than the ADF critical values, the null hypothesis that a unit root does exist is rejected and the 
conclusion is that the series is stationary. 
3.6.2 Granger Causality Test  
A variable "Y" can be Granger-caused by "X" if the coefficients of the lagged "X"'s are 
statistically significant. That says, "X" causes "Y" and "Y" equally causes "X." In this study, it is 
presumed that government consumption expenditure predicts the level of the explanatory 
variables. Similarly, the explanatory variables can as well influence government consumption 
expenditure, and as such, the model used can suffer from simultaneous bias. The study tested for 
Granger causality of the explanatory variabes on government consumption expenditure variable, 
by running a linear equation with government consumption as the dependent variable, and then 
the F-test was carried out for the combined significance of the study model.  
3.6.3 Cointegration Test  
Cointegration is a technique applied to examine the presence of long-term linkages or co-
movement between variables which are non-stationary, that is, a time series with a unit root. In 
practice, it is in order to establish the order of integration of each variable in the model before 
testing for cointegration. A variable Yt is integrated of order d (d) if it exhibits stationary only 
after being differenced (d) times. The time series variable is assumed to be integrated of order d, 
I(d), if non-stationarity can be removed by differentiating a series d times and the stochastic 
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trend remains after differencing only d-1 times. A variable Yt without a stochastic trend or unit 
root is considered to be integrated of order zero, I(0). A set of time series of same integration 
order d is assumed to be cointegrated if a linear combination of the explanatory variables exists, 
that is, I (0). Also, according to (Lutkepohl, 2006), in econometrics, two or more variables are 
considered to be cointegrated if a long-run or equilibrium relation exists among them.  
Accordingly, Johansen and Juselius test (1990) is used to test for co-integration based on the fact 
that the residuals from the regression exhibit stationarity i.e. the residuals are integrated of the 
order zero I(0). Therefore, the Johansen test has been used to establish whether the noise term εt 
is I(0). The regression coefficients were examined for significance using τ statistics for Y. The 
null hypothesis is that there is unit root, i.e. the residuals from the regression do not exhibit 
cointegration at levels. The null hypothesis that the residuals (εt ) do not exhibit cointegration at 
levels is rejected when the τ statistic is less than the critical τ statistic by taking absolute values. 
Thus, the guideline here is:  
Null hypothesis H0= no cointegration between the variables  
Alternative hypothesis H1= there is cointegration among variables.  
3.6.4 Diagnostic Tests  
Regression diagnostics play a critical role in finding and validating a good predictive relationship 
among the dependent variables. The following diagnostic tests were carried out: 
heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and multicollinearity.  
3.6.4.1 Heteroscedasticity Test   
Economic analyses rely on heteroscedasticity test to examine whether a specified model has a 
constant variance. Implicitly, when the residuals of a model exhibit a constant variance then we 
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can conclude that there is absence of heteroscedasticity in the time series.  The variance of a 
linear regression model should be constant for the linear regression model to hold, and if the 
error terms do not have constant variance, then they are said to be heteroscedastic. Breusch-
Godfrey test is employed to test for the existence of heteroscedasticity. Unlike non-stationarity, 
there is no general method for correcting heteroscedasticity. However, if the error term is related 
to the variance, it is an econometric principle to make some changes to the regression. For 
example, in a case where the variance is inversely related to the error term then we can obtain the 
product of xt and each term in the equation by xt or its square root. Also, if the variance is related 
to the time, then we can do the same using time, t.   
3.6.4.2Autocorrelation Test  
Autocorrelation refers to an econometric problem whereby two or more consecutive errors are 
related. It is a common issue in the time series data. This study used Lagrange-Multiplier and 
Durbin-Watson tests for autocorrelation.  A correlation test on the error terms is carried out to 
determine the magnitude of their correlation coefficients. Since most econometric problem 
revolving around time series show positive autocorrelation, as was observed by Montgomery et 
al. (2001), then the hypothesis which is presumably considered in the Durbin-Watson test is:  
Ho: ρ = 0  
H1: ρ >1  
Autocorrelation is corrected by transforming the original autoregressive error terms into one with 
non-autocorrelated error term so as to conform to the use of OLS procedures; let:  
Yt=β1 + β2X2t +… βKXkt + et, t=1..…………………...……………………………..…….… (3.19)  
et = ρet-1+Vt (0<| ρ |<1) ..……………………………….…………………………………… (3.20)  
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Where: both et and Vt have zero means and the constant variances through time, et are 
autocorrelated, but Vt is not and ρ is the correlation coefficient between errors in the period t and 
errors in the period t-1.  
3.6.4.3 Multicollinearity Test  
Multicollinearity is an econometric problem in which two or more independent variables in 
multiple-variate regression model are highly interdependence and provide repeated information 
about the response, meaning that one can be a linear combination of the others with a non-trivial 
degree of accuracy.  In cases of multicollinearity, parametrized estimates may change randomly 
as a response to small variations in the model.   
Mathematically, a set of econometric variables is perfectly multicollinear if there exists a linear 
combination of one or more of the variables. In order to detect this problem of multicollinearity, 
the constructed models based on all the independent variables were passed through a series of 
statistical tests to examine their adjusted R-squared as well as the number of insignificant t-
ratios.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PRESENTATION, INTERPRETATION, AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS  
4.1 Introduction 
This section reports the discussions on descriptive statistics of the study data, econometric 
analysis of the time series, interpretation and the discussion of the econometric results. In order 
to achieve the objectives of the study, three models were adopted to examine the research 
questions of the study. The summary statistics of the study are presented in section 4.2. The 
econometric tests are discussed in part 4.3, while section 4.4 contains the discussion on 
diagnostic tests and finally hypothesis testing and regression results are presented in section 4.5 
and section 4.6 respectively.   
4.2 Descriptive Analysis of Data 
In time series analysis, descriptive analysis of data enables us to examine the variability of data 
so as to determine if the time series data can be subjected to further statistical analysis. Table A2 
all through to Table A4 below show the STATA output summary for descriptive analysis for the 
three Models.  
 Table A2: Summary Statistics for Economic Model 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
 -------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
          GC |        55    3.08e+09    2.18e+09   3.51e+08   8.92e+09 
         GDP |        55    2.28e+10    1.39e+10   4.79e+09   5.81e+10 
          FA |        55    1118.779    825.5417      280.3    3572.62 
         INF |        55    10.60218    8.323728       .099     45.979 
         FDI |        55    9.64e+10    1.52e+11   1.28e+08   5.19e+11 
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         INT |        55    .1804364    .0533659        .12        .36 
         TRO |        55    1.750309    .4833703      1.087      3.008 
        DEBT |        55    4.94e+09    4.79e+09   2.27e+08   2.57e+10 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
              Source: Author, 2018 
Table A3: Summary Statistics for Structural Model 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
        Year |        55        1990    16.02082       1963       2017 
          GC |        55    3.08e+09    2.18e+09   3.51e+08   8.92e+09 
         URB |        55    .2124364    .0757835       .087       .362 
       YOUNG |        55    1.15e+07     4854349    4269399   2.01e+07 
         OLD |        55    693468.6    277024.7     324836    1335152 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
               Source: Author, 2018 
Table A4: Summary Statistics for Political-institutional Model 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
          GC |        55    3.08e+09    2.18e+09   3.51e+08   8.92e+09 
         SAP |        55    .1272727      .33635          0          1 
       DEMOC |        55    .4727273    .5038572          0          1 
         WAR |        55    .1090909    .3146266          0          1 
       CHIGH |        55    .1454545     .355808          0          1 
        CLOW |        55    .2181818    .4168182          0          1 
   CMODERATE |        55    .2181818    .4168182          0          1 
  CQUITEHIGH |        55    .0727273    .2620818          0          1 
   CQUITELOW |        55    .1818182    .3892495          0          1 
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       ELECT |        55          .2    .4036867          0          1 
 ------------+----------------------------------- 
             |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
 ------------+----------------------------------- 
        FREE |          7       12.73       12.73  
       DEMOC |         26       47.27       47.27 
         WAR |          6       10.91      100.00 
        HIGH |          8       14.55       14.55 
         LOW |         12       21.82       36.36 
    MODERATE |         12       21.82       58.18 
  QUITE HIGH |          4        7.27       65.45 
   QUITE LOW |         10       18.18       83.64 
    VERY LOW |          9       16.36      100.00 
       ELECT |         11       20.00       20.00 
-------------+-------------------------------------- 
Source: Author, 2018 
A closer look at the mean and standard deviation for Economic Model and Structural Model 
show that there was no case where the standard deviation was greater than the mean, thus, an 
implication that the mean was a good indicator of the parameters in the two models. However, 
this was not the case with Political-institutional Model where the summary statistics for all the 
explanatory variables reported minimum values of zero and maximum values of 1. This situation 
was expected since Politico-institutional Model consisted of categorical variables which are 
discrete in nature and which assume either a value of 1 for presence or 0 otherwise. The 
frequency of occurrence for each of the attributes and their percentage distribution throughout 
the study period is displayed in the summary statistics for Politico-institutional Model above. 
This study adopted four dummy variables: dummies for market liberalization, political cohesion, 
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political cycles and political liberty all consisting of two levels of attribute representation as 
shown in Table A4 above. However, the variable COR consisted of six levels of attributes since 
the study used data on corruption perception index which was measured in a range of values (1= 
VERY LOW to 6 = VERY HIGH) depending on the degree of corruption. With this regard, all 
the categorical variables were coded to give numerical representation to the qualitative attributes 
and therefore whenever an event was observed, it was coded one (1), and zero (0) otherwise. 
There was 12.73 percent periods under structural adjustment programs, 20 percent of instances 
were under election periods and 47.27 percent represents periods under political freedom and 
liberty, while 10.19 percent represented periods of instability and political turmoil. Periods under 
which corruption cases were either quite high or high represented accounted for 21.82 percent of 
the total cases across the study period as can be seen in Table A4. 
As for the Trade Openness Index, the mean value was 0.526 with a standard deviation of 0.2565. 
The highest and the lowest values for this variable were 0.083 and 1.1 respectively. The Rates of 
Interest over the period of the study averaged 18 percent with a standard deviation of 0.533, with 
the highest and the lowest values being 36.2 percent and 12 percent respectively. External debt 
stock, on the other hand, averaged USD 4,940 million with a standard deviation of 479 million. 
The highest and the lowest values for the variable were USD 227 million and USD 25,700 
million. Gross Domestic Product for Kenya over the period of the study averaged USD 22,800 
million with a standard deviation of 13,900 million. Its highest and lowest values ever recorded 
were USD 58,100 million and USD 4,790 million respectively. Foreign Direct Investment, on 
the other hand, averaged USD 96,400 million and with a standard deviation of 152,000 million. 
The respective highest value was USD 519,000 million, and it can also be seen that there was a 
tie when FDI receipts into Kenya hit below USD 1 thousand. As for foreign aid, the mean value 
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was USD 1,118.7 79 with a standard deviation of USD 825.5. The respective highest and lowest 
values for the variable were USD 3,572.63 thousand and 280.3  respectively. 
From Table A3, it can be observed that, on average, from 1963 to 2017, the ratio of urban to 
rural populations was about 22 percent with a standard deviation of about 5. The highest and the 
lowest rates of Urbanization ever experienced were 36 percent and 8 percent respectively over 
the study period. The population of the old whose ages were 65 and above averaged 693,486.6 
with a standard deviation of 277,024.7. The portion of the young population in Kenya over the 
period of the study averaged 11.6 million with a standard deviation of 4,854,349. The highest 
and the lowest population of the young ever recorded occurred in the years 2017 and 1963, 
respectively, with respective values of 20.1 million and 4.269399 million. The respective lowest 
and highest values for the variable old population were 1,335,152 and 324,438. Government 
consumption expenditure for the period of the study had a mean value of USD 3,080 million 
with a standard deviation of 2,180 million. The respective highest and lowest values for the 
variable were USD 8,970 million and USD 351 million respectively. 
From the descriptive analysis of data above, it can be seen that the tie series exhibit variability as 
can be seen from the respective minima and maxima of the time series and can thus be subjected 
to further statistical analysis.  
4.3 Econometric Analysis 
As part of econometric tradition and practice, it is in order to ensure that the estimates are 
consistent and efficient and for such reasons, it was necessary to observe that pre-estimation 
assumptions underlying time series analysis were met. It was therefore imperative that, before 
estimating the response equations, the time series were tested for correlation analysis of the 
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explanatory variables, stationarity of each of the variables in the series, and as well as co-
integration of the time series.  
4.3.1 Correlation Analysis 
 The study conducted correlation analysis of the variables in each of the three models in order to 
establish any possibility of multicollinearity among them. In many cases correlation coefficients 
are used as criteria to specifying variables to be included in a predictor regression model. As 
much as correlation coefficients help in establishing the degree of association between two 
variables, very high correlation coefficients may imply a severe multicollinearity in the specified 
model.  Table A5 all through to Table A7 present the findings on correlation analysis of the 
variables in the three models. 
Table A5: Correlation coefficients for Economic Model 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
       |    GC     GDP      FA     INF     FDI     INT     TRO     DEBT 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
    GC |1.0000  
   GDP |0.6490* 1.0000  
       |0.0324 
    FA |0.5552* 0.4330* 1.0000  
       |0.0561   0.0732 
   INF |0.4480*  0.4663*  0.4513*  1.0000  
       |0.07206  0.0713   0.0710 
   FDI |0.4826*  0.4777*  0.6052*  0.2334   1.0000  
       |0.07325  0.0755   0.0589   0.0863 
   INT |-0.0593  -0.1146  -0.1549   0.3538* -0.1701   1.0000  
       |0.6673   0.4048   0.2587   0.0381   0.2143 
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    TRO|0.5222*  0.6768*  0.3211*  0.2701*  0.6960* -0.1383   1.0000  
       |0.0847   0.0489   0.0412   0.0461   0.0473   0.3138 
   DEBT|0.6128*  0.6113*  0.4370*  0.5275*  0.6824* -0.1300   0.6915*  1.0000 
       |0.0455   0.0467   0.0711   0.0823   0.0423   0.3442   0.0381  
     -------------+------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Source: Author, 2018 
Table A6:  Correlation coefficients for Structural Model  
-------------------------------------------------------- 
              |      LGC     LURB   LYOUNG     LOLD 
-------------+------------------------------------ 
         LGC |   1.0000  
        LURB |   0.8917*  1.0000  
             |   0.0000 
      LYOUNG |   0.8660*  0.8884*  1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0000 
        LOLD |   0.8770*  0.8757*  0.8881*  1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000  
---------------------------------------------------------- 
            Source: Author, 2018 
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Table A7: Correlation coefficients for Politico-institutional Model 
5% critical value (two-tailed) = 0.2656 for n = 55 
GC DDSAP_1 DDSAP_2 DDCOG_1 DDCOG_2  
1.0000 0.1548 -0.1548 -0.8408 0.8408 GC 
 1.0000 -1.0000 -0.2523 0.2523 DDSAP_1 
  1.0000 0.2523 -0.2523 DDSAP_2 
   1.0000 -1.0000 DDCOG_1 
    1.0000 DDCOG_2 
      
DDPOC_1 DDPOC_2 DCOR_1 DCOR_2 DCOR_3  
-0.5082 0.5082 -0.5113 -0.3647 -0.2347 GC 
-0.1336 0.1336 0.1689 0.1800 -0.7229 DDSAP_1 
0.1336 -0.1336 -0.1689 -0.1800 0.7229 DDSAP_2 
0.3696 -0.3696 0.4188 0.4464 0.3238 DDCOG_1 
-0.3696 0.3696 -0.4188 -0.4464 -0.3238 DDCOG_2 
1.0000 -1.0000 0.1548 0.1650 0.1849 DDPOC_1 
 1.0000 -0.1548 -0.1650 -0.1849 DDPOC_2 
  1.0000 -0.2085 -0.2337 DCOR_1 
   1.0000 -0.2490 DCOR_2 
    1.0000 DCOR_3 
      
DCOR_4 DCOR_5 DCOR_6 DDELE_1 DDELE_2  
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0.2471 0.4623 0.6228 0.0668 -0.0668 GC 
0.2017 0.1576 0.1069 -0.0818 0.0818 DDSAP_1 
-0.2017 -0.1576 -0.1069 0.0818 -0.0818 DDSAP_2 
-0.5579 -0.4357 -0.2958 -0.0728 0.0728 DDCOG_1 
0.5579 0.4357 0.2958 0.0728 -0.0728 DDCOG_2 
0.1849 -0.6827 -0.1266 0.0292 -0.0292 DDPOC_1 
-0.1849 0.6827 0.1266 -0.0292 0.0292 DDPOC_2 
-0.2337 -0.1825 -0.1239 0.0246 -0.0246 DCOR_1 
-0.2490 -0.1945 -0.1320 -0.1179 0.1179 DCOR_2 
-0.2791 -0.2179 -0.1479 0.0660 -0.0660 DCOR_3 
1.0000 -0.2179 -0.1479 -0.0440 0.0440 DCOR_4 
 1.0000 -0.1155 0.0516 -0.0516 DCOR_5 
  1.0000 0.0350 -0.0350 DCOR_6 
   1.0000 -1.0000 DDELE_1 
    1.0000 DDELE_2 
          Source: Author, 2018 
The Correlation matrices revealed that there was indeed some degree of association among the 
variables under study and, thus, implying that each of the variables could be used to specify the 
respective models for prediction and forecasting purposes in regression models. The variables 
did exhibit very high correlations to worry about multicollinearity problem in the models except 
for Structural Model in which all the variables showed high correlation coefficients. This 
scenario suggested a case of multicollinearity among the aforementioned variables. The 
respective p-values show that correlation coefficients were significant since their respective p-
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values were less than 5% significance level. This condition was double checked by running 
variance inflation factors to affirm if indeed there existed a problem of multicollinearity among 
the variables.  
4.3.2 Variance Inflation Factor Analysis 
The time series in the Economic Model and Structural Model were subjected to collinearity test 
to examine the extent of multicollinearity among the variables in the system of equations. In 
practice, variance inflation factor test statistics are used to gauge the level of multicollinearity in 
a system of equation. The results of variance inflation factor analysis for the two system 
equations in Economic Model and Structural Model are presented in Table A8 and Table A9. 
Table A 8: Variance Inflation Factor Analysis for Economic Model 
----------------+--------------------------- 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
        GDP |     25.51    0.039200 
       DEBT |     22.29    0.044863 
        FDI |      5.33    0.187617 
         FA |      5.14    0.194553 
        TRO |      5.03    0.1988o7 
        INF |      2.09    0.478469 
        INT |      1.52    0.656623 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |     11.19 
Source: Author, 2018 
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Table A 9: Variance Inflation Factor Analysis Structural Model 
----------------+---------------------------- 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
      YOUNG |     87.75    0.011396 
        URB |     43.41    0.023035 
        OLD |     42.16    0.023721 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |     57.77 
---------------+---------------------------- 
Source: Author, 2018 
Overall correlation was very high in the Structural model as indicated by the mean VIF values of 
11.19 and 57.77 for Economic Model and Structural Model respectively. The test results for 
multiple correlation coefficients for the Economic Model show that there was moderate 
multicollinearity exhibited by the variables except for external debt overhang and gross domestic 
product whose VIF statistics were above 5 which is the minimum threshold for tolerating 
multicollinearity problem. VIF statistics below 5 indicate less severity in multicollinearity to 
warrant any corrective measures. However, the variables DEBT and GDP in Economic Model 
exhibited higher levels of multicollinearity, a situation which is undesirable in time series 
analyses. Just as it was observed in the correlation analysis, all the explanatory variables in 
Structural Model were highly correlated and this was expected since urbanization rate was 
proxied by urban-rural population comparisons which encompassed both the population of the 
young and the old in the Structural model. Although, goodness of fit and the degree of precision 
of the predictors are preserved even when a model is fitted with highly correlated variables, 
higher levels of correlation can easily cause erratic changes in the coefficients and increase the 
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standard errors of the variables in question. Higher degrees of correlation make coefficients and 
standard errors to be too sensitive to slight changes in the model and thus making the 
interpretation of the coefficients invalid. Considering this argument, it follows that high degrees 
of correlation in a model is undesirable and therefore should be corrected. Multicollinearity can 
be corrected by either dropping the highly correlated variables in the model or by linearly 
combining the said variables. However, one major drawback for these methods is that the degree 
of freedom in the model is reduced since the number of variables must also reduce. In cases 
where multicollinearity is structurally induced, centring one of the highly correlated variables in 
the model can be done to solve the problem.  In the face of all the above challenges, Principal 
Component Analysis or partial least square regression can be conducted. In this regard, the 
variables in the Structural Model were standardized since the high correlation in the model could 
have been structurally induced owing to the fact that all the data for the three variables were 
drawn from or was portion of the general population data and therefore acted as a multiple of the 
other. 
4.3.2 Stationarity Analysis  
The series plots in figure below give a pictorial description of the nature of variables in the 
Economic Model and Structural Model. The graphical representation in both Figure 10 and 
Figure 11 show a likelihood of the presence of unit root in the two models.  
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      Figure 10: Time series plot for Economic Model  
      Source: Author, 2018 
 
          Figure 11: Time series plot for Structural Model 
              Source: Author, 2018 
The results in both Figure 10 and Figure 11 indicate that the times series in the two models 
exhibited a strong trends and drifts and as such it was imperative to employ stationarity testing 
techniques to examine the presence of unit roots and the order of integration in the series for the 
two models. Strong trends in time series can be reduced by applying logarithmic transformation 
on the system equations and allow the coefficients to be interpreted as elasticities (Asteriou and 
Price, 2007). However, logarithmic transformation and data transformation in general are known 
erode original properties of the original series and introducing new issues which were not in the 
model. Using ADF test technique, the two series were subjected to stationarity checks to 
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examine the presence of unit root and the order of integration in the variables in the two system 
equations in the Economic Model and Structural Model. The results of stationarity tests are 
displayed in Table A10 all through to Table A13. 
 Table A10: ADF Test for Economic Model at Levels 
                       lags(0)      Number of obs   =        55                 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10%Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 GC             -2.417            -4.141            -3.496            -3.178 
GDP             -2.528            -4.141            -3.496            -3.178 
 FA             -0.121            -4.141            -3.496            -3.178 
INF             -3.764            -4.141            -3.496            -3.178 
FDI             -1.232            -4.141            -3.496            -3.178 
INT             -2.432            -4.141            -3.496            -3.178 
TRO             -2.382            -4.141            -3.496            -3.178 
DEBT             8.667            -4.141            -3.496            -3.178 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Author, 2018 
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Table A11: ADF Test for Structural Model at Levels 
                             lags(0)      Number of obs   =        54    
                Test       1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic          Value             Value         Value 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
GC          -2.417            -4.141            -3.496           -3.178 
URB         -1.074            -4.141            -3.496           -3.178 
YOUNG       -3.148            -4.141            -3.496           -3.178 
OLD         -0.117            -4.141            -3.496           -3.178 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Author, 2018 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests   are used to examine the null hypothesis that a given times series 
is stationary, that is, it exhibits a deterministic trend against the alternative hypothesis that a 
system equation is non –stationary meaning that the time series has a unit root and exhibits 
stochastic trends. A time series with a unit root usually results in unreliable estimates and, thus, 
spurious and misleading. Each of the series in the two models turned out to be non-stationary as 
indicated by the test statistics at 5 % significance. From Table A10 and Table A11 above, none 
of the series in either model was stationary at levels, that is, all of them were not integrated of 
order I(0). This had the implication that there was unit root in the two models, meaning that they 
exhibited stochastic trends, a property which is undesirable. The test statistics for each of the 
variables was less than the absolute critical values of 3.496 at 5 % significance level and 
therefore the alternative hypothesis of no of unit were rejected at levels for all the variables or 
rather the null hypothesis that there was unit root in the series could not be rejected. This meant 
that the series in the two models were non-stationary at levels. It could therefore be concluded 
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that the said series were integrated of at least order I(1). In further quest for stationary among the 
variables, each of the non-stationary series was then differenced before they were again 
subjected to stationary test analysis because it was then that they could be used to provide 
meaningful statistical information. The results obtained are shown Table A12 and Table A13  
 
Table A 12: ADF Test for Model 1 at First Difference 
                              lags(0)      Number of obs   =        54 
                  Test      1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value          Value 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
DGC        -9.775            -4.146            -3.498            -3.179 
DGDP       -8.864            -4.146            -3.498            -3.179 
DFA        -13.046            -4.146            -3.498           -3.179 
DFDI        -9.420            -4.146            -3.498           -3.179 
DINT        -8.497            -4.143            -3.497           -3.178 
DTRO       -11.186            -4.146            -3.498           -3.179 
DDEBT       -7.583            -4.146            -3.498           -3.179 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Author, 2018 
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Table A 13: ADF Test for Model 2 at First Difference 
                             lags(0)      Number of obs   =        54   
                Test       1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic          Value             Value         Value 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------  
GC          -2.417            -4.141            -3.496           -3.178 
DURB        -7.828            -4.146            -3.498           -3.179 
DYOUNG      -5.948            -4.141            -3.496           -3.178 
DOLD        -2.631            -4.146            -3.498           -3.179 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Author, 2018 
Following the concluded ADF tests, each of the non-stationary variables in the two models 
became stationary upon first differrencing. It was therefore concluded that the order of 
integration for the variables in the two models was I(1).  
4.3.3 Lag Selection Criteria 
System equations such as VAR, VECM and Johansen Cointegration Test may require lag 
selection criteria. Following the foregoing, an optimal lag must be chosen to fit the model and 
this is done through one of the available lag selection criteria; LL, LR, FPE, AIC, HQIC and 
SBIC lag selection criteria. Each of these criteria can be used on its own merit to arrive at 
optimal lag length to fit a model and in most cases majority decision is granted as the best 
decision for lag selection. As Enders (1995) observed, it is better to have a uniform lag lengths 
for the variables to be used in the system equations because working with different lag lengths 
for different variables causes asymmetry in the systems and sometimes lag selection for 
individual variables may turn out with very high lag lengths which might end up washing away 
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the degree of freedom in the model. In deciding on the correct lag length, a value corresponding 
to the least statistics in the criteria is chosen. However, AIC lag selection criterion is normally 
preferred (Pesaran and Shin, 1995; 1999). 
Table A14: Selection-order criteria for Economic Model 
   Sample:  1967 - 2017                         Number of obs      =        51 
  +---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
  |lag |    LL      LR      df    p      FPE       AIC      HQIC      SBIC    | 
  |----+----------------------------------------------------------------------| 
  |  0 | -5250.05                      4.9e+79   206.198   206.314   206.501  | 
  |  1 | -4807.27  885.57   64  0.000  1.8e+73   191.344   192.386   194.071* | 
  |  2 | -4761.83  90.869   64  0.015  4.4e+73   192.072    194.04   197.223  | 
  |  3 | -4660.96  201.74   64  0.000  1.8e+73   190.626   193.521   198.202  | 
  |  4 |  -4514.2  293.52*  64  0.000  2.4e+72*   187.38*  191.202*   197.38  | 
  +---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
  Source: Author, 2018 
 
 Table A15: Selection-order criteria for Structural Model 
   Sample:  1967 - 2017                         Number of obs =     51 
  --------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
  |lag |    LL      LR      df    p      FPE       AIC      HQIC      SBIC                                                                   
  |----+--------------------------------------------------------------------| 
  |  0 | -2363.38                      2.5e+35   92.8386   92.8965   92.9901                                                                 
  |  1 | -1866.74  993.28   16  0.000  1.6e+27     73.99   74.2795   74.7476                                                                 
  |  2 | -1768.96  195.57*  16  0.000  6.6e+25*  70.7828*  71.3039*  72.1464                                                                 
  |  3 | -1756.41  25.101   16  0.068  7.8e+25   70.9181   71.6707   72.8878                                                                 
  |  4 | -1746.91  19.001   16  0.269  1.1e+26   71.1729   72.1572   73.7487                                                                 
  +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
Source: Author, 2018 
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From the statistical outputs in Table A14 and Table A15 above, it is evident that lag selection 
criteria has advised lag length of 4 as the optimum lag to be used in any of the system equations 
such as VAR, VECM and Johansen cointegration tests for Economic Model. For the Structural 
Model, however, lag selection criteria showed that a lag length of 2 would be optimal for the 
model. Four out of five criteria, LR, FPE, AIC and HQIC, suggested lags 4 and 2 for Economic 
Model and Structural Model respectively as the optimal lag lengths for the respective models. 
4.3.4 Cointegration Analysis  
Since all the study variables were found to be I(1), it was very useful to establish whether the 
variables possessed inherent long run equilibrium relationships between them. The null 
supposition for this trial is that there were no cointegration equations against the alternative 
hypothesis would follow that at least there is a cointegration equation. To achieve this, first and 
foremost, the time series data were subjected to unrestricted cointegration rank test in order to 
determine whether there are no cointegrating equations. The decision to be followed here is that 
if the trace analysis reveals some cointegrating equations, then the null hypothesis is rejected and 
the alternative hypothesis is accepted instead.  
Table A16: Johansen Cointegration Test for Economic Model 
Trend: constant                          Number of obs =      51 
Sample:  1967 - 2017                             Lags =       4 
                                                        5%                                                            
maximum                                      trace    critical 
  rank    parms       LL       eigenvalue  statistic    value 
    0      200    -4712.6327           .    276.9902   156.00 
87 
 
    1      215    -4657.8794     0.88319    167.4835   124.24 
    2      228    -4623.3277     0.74204     98.3802    94.15 
    3      239    -4597.9604     0.63020     47.6456*   68.52 
    4      248    -4582.8666     0.44673     17.4580    47.21 
    5      255    -4576.6858     0.21525      5.0963    29.68 
    6      260    -4574.1376     0.09510      0.0000    15.41 
    7      263    -4574.1376     0.00000      0.0000     3.76 
    8      264    -4574.1376    -0.00000 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                         5% 
maximum                                       max     critical 
  rank    parms       LL       eigenvalue  statistic    value 
    0      200    -4712.6327           .    109.5067    51.42 
    1      215    -4657.8794     0.88319     69.1033    45.28 
    2      228    -4623.3277     0.74204     50.7346    39.37 
    3      239    -4597.9604     0.63020     30.1876    33.46 
    4      248    -4582.8666     0.44673     12.3617    27.07 
    5      255    -4576.6858     0.21525      5.0963    20.97 
    6      260    -4574.1376     0.09510      0.0000    14.07 
    7      263    -4574.1376     0.00000      0.0000     3.76 
    8      264    -4574.1376    -0.00000 
----------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Author, 2018 
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Table A17: Johansen Cointegration Test for Structural Model 
Trend: constant                          Number of obs =      53 
Sample:  1965 - 2017                              Lags =       2 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                         5% 
maximum                                      trace    critical 
  rank    parms       LL       eigenvalue  statistic    value 
    0      20     -1863.8318           .     47.5760*   47.21 
    1      27     -1851.1009     0.38147     18.4143    29.68 
    2      32     -1844.6205     0.21694      5.4534    15.41 
    3      35     -1841.9775     0.09492      0.1673     3.76 
    4      36     -1841.8938     0.00315 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                         5% 
maximum                                       max     critical 
  rank    parms       LL       eigenvalue  statistic    value 
    0      20     -1863.8318           .     25.4617    27.07 
    1      27     -1851.1009     0.38147     12.9609    20.97 
    2      32     -1844.6205     0.21694      5.2860    14.07 
    3      35     -1841.9775     0.09492      0.1673     3.76 
    4      36     -1841.8938     0.00315 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Author, 2018 
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From the Johansen Cointegration test for Economic Model, the alternative hypothesis that the 
model has at least one cointegrating equation could not be rejected or rather to say that the 
variables in the model had long-run relationship among them. This also meant that the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration could not be accepted. The trace statistics revealed 3 cointegrating 
equations with a probability value of 0.63020, which is greater than 5 percent significance level 
and, thus, it was quite convincing that there existed a long run relationship among the variables 
in the Economic Model. As such Economic Model would be best estimated using Vector-Error 
Correction since the variables in the model were integrated of the order I(1). From the Johansen 
Cointegration test for Structural Model, the null hypothesis that there was no cointegrating 
equation in the model could not be rejected or rather to say that variables in the model do not 
have long run association among them. The trace statistic for Structural Model revealed zero (0) 
cointegrating equations since the entire trace statistic throughout all the cointegration ranks were 
less than the respective critical values at 5 percent significance level. Also, the respective 
probability values for each of cointegration rank in Structural Model were all less 5 percent, 
meaning that the trace statistics were insignificant to reject the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration.  Following this result, it therefore implied that Vector Autoregressive Model 
would be the most appropriate estimation method for Structural Model since the variables in the 
model were not cointegrated (Pesaran and Shin, 1995; 1999).  
Before drawing any conclusions from the findings of this study, the study performed a series of 
analytic tests on the time series to ascertain their statistical correctness and effectiveness. 
Residual-based tests, together with stability tests, were conducted and the results are presented in 
the subsequent sections of this study.  
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4.4 Diagnostic Tests 
In the study, three models were estimated in order to achieve the first, second, and third 
objectives of the study. In this effect, Government Consumption Expenditure was regressed on 
the centered values of urbanization rate, young population and old population for Structural 
Model following the prior decision made on the conducted multicollinearity tests. Before making 
any conclusions from the study findings, a number of diagnostic tests on the models were carried 
out to determine their statistical soundness (Gujarati, 2004). Diagnostic tests for serial 
correlation, autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity and functional form were conducted on 
the two models. 
4.4.1 Tests for Serial Correlation 
Autocorrelation is said to be present in a situation where the magnitude of the regression 
residuals are related to that of the new residuals. In the event that this occurs, there would be an 
estimation efficiency loss in the estimates. Residuals which are highly correlated to the past 
values are likely to give unreliable results.  To guard against invalid and unreliable regression 
results, residual test was conducted to ensure that the coefficients were consistent. The Lagrange-
Multiplier test for no autocorrelation is normally used to examine the existence of serial 
correlation in a model, and it includes up to second lagged value of residuals per equation. 
Following this argument, Lagrange-Multiplier tests were conducted to establish the presence of 
autocorrelation in Economic Model and Structural Model. Lagrange-Multiplier tests the null 
hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation of the residuals in the system equation against the 
alternative hypothesis that there is serial correlation in the series in the model. In making 
conclusions on autocorrelation test, a comparison has to be made between the Lagrange-
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Multiplier probability values yielded in the test against the usual critical value of 5 percent. If 
Lagrange-Multiplier test reports a probability value of less than 5 percent, then the null 
hypothesis of no serial correlation is rejected or rather the alternative hypothesis that there is 
serial correlation in the series is accepted. Table A18 and Table A19 present the results of 
Lagrange-Multiplier Test for serial correlation in Economic Model and Structural Model. 
Table A 18: Autocorrelation Test for Economic Model 
   Lagrange-multiplier test 
  +--------------------------------------+ 
  | lag  |      chi2    df   Prob > chi2 | 
  |------+-------------------------------| 
  |   1  |   85.4305    64     0.06804   | 
  |   2  |   59.5454    64     0.63455   | 
  +--------------------------------------+ 
   H0: no autocorrelation at lag order 
Source: Author, 2018 
Table A 19Autocorrelation Test for Structural Model 
   Lagrange-multiplier test 
  +--------------------------------------+ 
  | lag  |      chi2    df   Prob > chi2 | 
  |------+-------------------------------| 
  |   1  |   19.0960    16     0.26371   | 
  |   2  |    8.7606    16     0.92295   | 
  +--------------------------------------+ 
   H0: no autocorrelation at lag order 
Source: Author, 2018 
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From the conducted Lagrange-Multiplier test, it is clear that the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation could not be rejected or rather was accepted since the probability values of the 
respective test statistics were all greater than 5 percent significance level throughout all the lags 
in both system of equations. This means there was no serial correlation in the variables specified 
in the model and that was desirable.  
4.4.2 Normality Tests 
An essential constraint in regression analysis is that the disturbance term of the regression model 
must assume a normal distribution with zero expected value and constant variance. To guard 
against the effects of heteroscedasticity and to ascertain normality, residual based tests were 
carried out on the output of each of the estimated equations. The null hypothesis to be examined 
here is that the residuals are normally distributed against the alternative hypothesis that the 
residuals do not follow a normal distribution. To make a decision on this, the hypothesis that the 
residuals are normally distributed is rejected when the Jarque-Bera tests statistics turn out to be 
inferior to the usual 5 percent significance level and accepted otherwise. The results of these tests 
for Economic Model, Structural Model and Politico-institutional Model are presented in Tables 
A6, A7, and A8 and Figure A1 while the results for Model 2 are presented in Tables A9, A10, 
and A11.  
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Table A20: Normality Test for Economic Model 
Jarque-Bera test 
  +--------------------------------------------------------+ 
  |           Equation |            chi2   df  Prob > chi2 | 
  |--------------------+-----------------------------------| 
  |                 GC |            0.789   2    0.67397   | 
  |                GDP |            1.639   2    0.44072   | 
  |                 FA |            3.281   2    0.19385   | 
  |                INF |            0.502   2    0.77792   | 
  |                FDI |            0.455   2    0.79639   | 
  |                INT |            0.702   2    0.70415   | 
  |                TRO |            1.227   2    0.54152   | 
  |               DEBT |            1.322   2    0.51627   | 
  |                ALL |            9.917  16    0.87091   | 
  +------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: Author, 2018 
For the Economic Model, the Jarque-Bera test statistics turned out to be greater than 5 percent 
for all the individual variables in the model as can be seen in Table A20 above. Thus, we could 
conclude that the residuals of each of the series in the Economic Model followed a normal 
distribution and the null hypothesis that the residuals were normally distributed could not be 
rejected. Similarly, the residuals of the overall model were also normally distributed since the p-
value for the whole was 87.09 percent, which is much bigger than 5 percent critical value. Thus, 
the normality test for the model as a whole could also not be rejected and the conclusion was, 
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thus, drawn that the regression residuals from the estimated Economic Model equation followed 
a normal distribution. 
Table A 21: Normality Test for Structural Model 
   Jarque-Bera test 
  +--------------------------------------------------------+ 
  |           Equation |            chi2   df  Prob > chi2 | 
  |--------------------+-----------------------------------| 
  |                 GC |            7.991   2    0.06643   | 
  |               ZURB |            6.928   2    0.09753   | 
  |             ZYOUNG |            1.189   2    0.55189   | 
  |               ZOLD |            1.139   2    0.56569   | 
  |                ALL |            7.247   8    0.05681   | 
  +--------------------------------------------------------+ 
Source: Author, 2018 
 
 For the Structural Model, the Jarque-Bera test statistics turned out to superior to the 5 percent 
critical value for each of the time series in the model as indicated in Table A21 above. That 
implies the null hypothesis that the residuals of the individual time series in the model are 
normally distributed could not be rejected. We can therefore state here that the residuals of the 
individual series followed a normal distribution.  On average, the residuals of the overall system 
also followed a normal distribution as indicated by the p-value of 5.681 percent which is greater 
than 5 percent critical significance level. Therefore, the null hypothesis of normality of the 
regression residuals could not be rejected at the 5 percent significance level. The conclusion is, 
thus, drawn that the regression residuals from the estimated Structural Model equation are in 
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accordance with a standard distribution. A system of  linear equation of normally distributed 
variables is regarded to have a normal distribution of the error terms and essentially have the 
implication that the coefficients of the estimates are also themselves normally distributed 
(Greene, 2008).  
4.4.3 Specification Tests 
To detect possibility of misspecification in the VECM model in Economic Model and Structural 
Model, the companion matrix of the corresponding VAR was generated and its eigenvalues and 
their corresponding moduli were then analyzed in comparison to unit band limits of a circle. A 
well specified and model stable will have all of its moduli of the companion matrix of the 
corresponding VAR falling within the unit band limits of a circle. If the eigenvalue stability 
condition reveals real root, then the model is not stable.   The results of the specification tests for 
Economic Model are displayed in Tables A22 and A23 below.  
 
Table A22: Eigenvalue stability test condition for Economic Model 
   Eigenvalue stability condition 
  +----------------------------------------+ 
  |        Eigenvalue        |   Modulus   | 
  |--------------------------+-------------| 
  |   1.154609 +  .1982024i  |    1.1715   | 
  |   1.154609 -  .1982024i  |    1.1715   | 
  |   1.020972               |   1.02097   | 
  |   .8233285 + .08126293i  |   .827329   | 
  |   .8233285 - .08126293i  |   .827329   | 
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  |   .5588477 +  .2051742i  |   .595321   | 
  |   .5588477 -  .2051742i  |   .595321   | 
  |   .3241411 +  .4934674i  |   .590405   | 
  |   .3241411 -  .4934674i  |   .590405   | 
  |  -.5724551               |   .572455   | 
  |  -.2455686 +  .3917534i  |   .462358   | 
  |  -.2455686 -  .3917534i  |   .462358   | 
  |   .3165786               |   .316579   | 
  |  .04646984 +  .3063663i  |   .309871   | 
  |  .04646984 -  .3063663i  |   .309871   | 
  |  -.1582071               |   .158207   | 
  +----------------------------------------+ 
   At least one eigenvalue is at least 1.0. 
     Source: Author, 2018 
  
 Table A23: Eigenvalue stability test condition for Structural Model 
Eigenvalue stability condition 
  +----------------------------------------+ 
  |        Eigenvalue        |   Modulus   | 
  |--------------------------+-------------| 
  |   .9035935 +  .1236521i  |   .907646   | 
  |   .9035935 -  .1236521i  |   .905394   | 
  |   .8224152 +  .1486242i  |   .836059   | 
  |   .8224152 -  .1486242i  |   .826059   | 
  |   .7364075 +  .1879924i  |   .760024   | 
  |   .7364075 -  .1879924i  |   .760024   | 
  |    .497213 +  .4234055i  |   .653064   | 
  |    .497213 -  .4234055i  |   .653064   | 
  +----------------------------------------+ 
   At least one eigenvalue is at least 1.0. 
   Source: Author, 2018 
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Eigenvalue stability test contains a table showing the eigenvalues of the companion matrix and 
their associated moduli. The table shows that one of the roots is 1. The table footer reminds us 
that the speciﬁed VECM imposes one unit modulus on the companion matrix. 
The output indicates that there is a real root at about 0.95.  
Table A24: Wald-lag Specification Test For Structural Model 
   Equation: GC 
  +------------------------------------+ 
  | lag |    chi2      df  Prob > chi2 | 
  |-----+------------------------------| 
  |   1 |  187.4372     4     0.000    | 
  |   2 |  33.32755     4     0.000    | 
  +------------------------------------+ 
   Equation: ZURB 
  +------------------------------------+ 
  | lag |    chi2      df  Prob > chi2 | 
  |-----+------------------------------| 
  |   1 |  394.3766     3     0.000    | 
  |   2 |  81.82692     3     0.000    | 
  +------------------------------------+ 
   Equation: ZYOUNG 
  +------------------------------------+ 
  | lag |    chi2      df  Prob > chi2 | 
  |-----+------------------------------| 
  |   1 |  559.1972     3     0.000    | 
  |   2 |  135.6865     3     0.000    | 
  +------------------------------------+ 
   Equation: ZOLD 
  +------------------------------------+ 
  | lag |    chi2      df  Prob > chi2 | 
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  |-----+------------------------------| 
  |   1 |  864.6312     3     0.000    | 
  |   2 |  242.2069     3     0.000    | 
  +------------------------------------+ 
   Equation: All 
  +------------------------------------+ 
  | lag |    chi2      df  Prob > chi2 | 
  |-----+------------------------------| 
  |   1 |  1950.245    13     0.000    | 
  |   2 |  471.7826    13     0.000    | 
  +------------------------------------+ 
Source: Author, 2018 
4.5 Hypothesis Testing Results 
Table A25 presents the results of the hypothesis tests for this study. The results show that all the 
null hypotheses in section 1.6 could be rejected except for foreign aid, urbanization rate and 
young population whose corresponding p-values of the coefficients were greater than 5 per cent 
critical value. For the rest of the variables, the p-values showed that the coefficients were 
statistically significant at 5 per cent and 1 per cent level of significance.  
Table A25: Hypothesis Tests 
Hypothesis Coefficient t-sticsatist p-value 
GDP positively affects GC 1.295213 10.11 0.000*** 
Foreign aid positively affects GC -58746.8 0.08 0.940 
Inflation rate positively affects GC 1.822308 8.57 0.000*** 
Foreign direct investment positively affects GC -o.0702632 8.41 0.000*** 
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Interest rate positively affects GC -7274.939 . . 
Trade openness positively affects GC -164.7232 . . 
Debt stock negatively affects GC -2.602987 7.01 0.000*** 
Urbanization rate positively affects GC . 2.315 0.315 
Young population positively affects GC . 0.7963 0.672 
Old population positively affects GC . 18.872 0.000*** 
Political liberty positively affects GC 6.40e+08 1.97 0.045* 
Political instability positively affects GC 7.54e+08 2.93 0.000*** 
Corruption negatively affects GC 2.88e+09 7.7 0.000*** 
Elections positively affect GC    
Source: Author, 2018   GC* is Government Consumption Expenditure 
4.6 Regression Results   
The results of the long-run and short-run estimations of the economic variables and structural 
equations are presented in Table A26 and Table A27 while those of Politico-institutional 
equation from OLS estimation are presented in Table A30. According to Granger (1988), a 
significant coefficient of the error-correction term (ECM) indicates long-run Granger causality 
running from the explanatory to the dependent variables.  
4.6.1 Long-Run Coefficients of Economic model 
This study estimated the system equation in Economic Model which comprised of economic 
variables: gross domestic product, foreign aid, inflation rate, foreign direct investment, interest 
rate, trade openness and external debt stock using VECM model as was earlier envisaged. The 
estimation was conducted on the variables for the period 1963 to 2017 covering a total of 55 
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observations. Peseran et al. (2001) proposed Schartz-Bayesian criterion to be used to determine 
the number of optimal lags to be considered in the conditional Error-Correction Model. 
However, this study settled on the optimal lag lengths suggested by more of the lag selection 
criteria.  When the coefficient of the error term is negative and its corresponding  probability 
value is inferior to 5 percent critical value, then the null hypothesis of long run causality running 
from the endogenous variables to the target model is not reject or rather the null hypothesis is 
accepted. The short run dynamics of the system equation in Economic Model was also obtained 
by examining their significance by comparing their respective p-values with 5 percent critical 
value in which case the latter is superior then short cause running from the lagged value to the 
dependent variable is confirmed. The results of the vector error-correction are presented in Table 
A26 below. 
Table A26: Vector-Error-Correction Model for Economic Model 
Sample:  1967 - 2017                               No. of obs      =        51 
                                                   AIC             =  191.0933 
Log likelihood = -4657.879                         HQIC            =  194.2054 
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  2.95e+69                         SBIC            =  199.2373 
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2 
Identification:  beta is exactly identified 
                 Johansen normalization restriction imposed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        beta |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
_ce1         | 
          GC |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
         GDP |  -1.295213    .128144   -10.11   0.000    -1.546371   -1.044056 
          FA |   58746.85   776991.6     0.08   0.940     -1464129     1581622 
         INF |  -1.822308   .2125307    -8.57   0.000     1.882358    6.326808 
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         FDI |   .0702632   .0083541     8.41   0.000     .0538895    .0866368 
         INT |   7274.939          .        .       .            .           . 
         TRO |   164.7232          .        .       .            .           . 
        DEBT |   2.602987   .3713241     7.01   0.000     1.875205    3.330769 
       _cons |   8.95e+09          .        .       .            .           . 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: Author, 2018 
The estimated VECM system reveals one error correction term (ce1), whose coefficient indicates 
the speed of adjustment of towards the long-run equilibrium. As indicated in the table above, the 
coefficient of the error term is negative and therefore the presupposition that the system 
converges towards a long-run equilibrium could not be ruled out. The coefficient of the error 
term was -0.0338675 indicating that the speed of adjustment towards long-run equilibrium was 
3.4 per cent towards the long-run equiibrium.  
From the Johansen normalization equation in the table above, government consumption 
expenditure is positioned as the dependent variable and as it has been observed that there is a 
long-run relationship running from the endogenous variables: gross domestic product, foreign 
aid, inflation rate, foreign direct investment, interest rate, trade openness and external debt 
overhang. A long-run system of a cointegrating equation can therefore be derived from the 
Johansen normalization equation in the table above as:  
Celt-1 = GCt-1 -1.295213GDPt-1+58746.85FAt-1-1.822308INFt-1+0.0702632FDIt-
1+7274.939INTt-1+164.7232TROt-1+2.602987DEBTt-1+ 8.95e+09………………………….. 4.1  
Where: ce1t-1 is the previous error correction term. Since the p-values of foreign aid, interest rate, 
trade openness and the constant turned out to be more than 5 percent critical value and a 
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conclusion  therefore that the effects were insignificant, meaning that their coefficients were 
statistically not different from zero, they can be excluded in the above equation 4.1 and the long-
run equation was then specified as: 
  Celt-1 = GCt-1 -1.295213GDPt-1-1.822308INFt-1+0.0702632FDIt-+2.602987DEBTt-1….. 4.2  
Since the coefficients of the Johansen normalization equation are reversed in the long-run, the 
final long-run equation for this system equation was therefore specified by reversing the signs to 
obtain: 
Celt-1 = GCt-1 +1.295213GDPt-1+1.822308INFt-1-0.0702632FDIt-1-2.602987DEBTt-1…… 4.3 
The general interpretation we can have here is that, in the long- run, interest rate, foreign direct 
investment and external debt stock have a negative impact while gross domestic product has a 
positive impact on government consumption expenditure in Kenya, ceteris paribus. Unlike the 
other variables which have been dropped from the system equation, the coefficients of the 
variables in equation are statistically significant since there p- values lie below 5 percent critical 
value.  
The short-run dynamics of the economic model are obtained by examining the short-run 
coefficients in the VECM output results in Table A26 above. By extracting significant short-run 
coefficients only based on p-values less than 5 percent critical value, only the first lag of external 
debt stock and the constant turned out to be significant. Joint lag effects of each variable were 
also examined to check the possibility of all the lags of a variable jointly explaining previous 
realization of government consumption expenditure in the short-run. 
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Table A27: short-Run Dynamics of the Economic Model 
Variable chi2(  3) p-value 
GDP 2.76 0.4294
 
FA 3.00 0.3919 
INF 2.94 0.4005 
FDI 0.20 0.9776 
INT 3.77 0.2877 
TRO 2.32 0.5084 
DEBT 12.50 0.0059*** 
Source: Author, 2018 
Following the analysis of the short-run results, it was found that only external debt stock and its 
first lag seem to explain the previous realization of government consumption expenditure in the 
long-run. Thus, the short-run equation for the economic model was specified as: 
GCt = Constant+DEBTt-1+ce1t-1……...……………………………………………...……….. 4.4 
 Fixing the coefficients of equation 4.4 using values obtained in VECM estimation outputs in 
Table A26 and dropping the constant since its coefficient is not different from zero, we get our 
short-run equation for the economic model as follows: 
GCt = -0.1244211DEBTt-1-0.0338675ce1………………...………………………...……….. 4.5 
The adjustment term is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, suggesting previous 
deviations from long-run equilibrium are corrected for within the current at a convergence speed 
of 3.39 percent as indicated in the coefficient of the error term in equation 4.5 above.  In the 
equation, it is also revealed that a percentage change in external debt stock is associated with 
12.4 percent decrease in government consumption expenditure, on average, ceteris paribus. Thus, 
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for the structural variables; gross domestic product, inflation rate, foreign direct investment and 
external debt stock explain the previous realization in government consumption expenditure in 
Kenya. 
The coefficient of gross domestic product in Table A26 was been found to be 1.295213 with a p-
value of 0.000, an indication that the coefficient was significant since the probability is less than 
5 percent critical value as shown in Johansen normalization equation in Table A26. As indicated 
earlier, the signs of the coefficients in Johansen normalization equation are reversed during 
interpretation, thus, yielding positive coefficient for the variable gross domestic product. The 
magnitude and sign of the coefficient show that a percentage increase in the level of gross 
domestic product would lead to about 1.3 percent increase in Government Consumption 
Expenditure in Kenya. This result was in line with the prior assumption made in the study that 
gross domestic product has a significant positive influence to government consumption 
expenditure.  The findings also agree with the observations made by Omar (1990) who argues 
that as GDP of a country increase, the government spending activities also increase along with it. 
The government’s roles and responsibilities in areas such as the provision of security and 
maintaining balance in various economic variables are bound to increase. As national income 
increases, the government’s responsibilities in meeting the needs of the people increase. The 
government has to undertake investments in the national institutions and expand many of its 
services so as to enhance its capacity to meet the increasing needs of the people. Shonchoy 
(2010), in his study to examine the determinants of government consumption expenditure among 
developing countries, also observed that increases in real gross domestic product increase 
government future consumption expenditure. Aregbeyen and Akpan (2013) in their study of the 
long-term determinants of government expenditure in Nigeria also found a similar result and 
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observed that as more revenues were generated, the government’s propensity to spend increases 
proportionately across the different cadres of expenditure. Thus, consumption spending being the 
lion’s share in most government expenditure categories is bound to increase by significant 
magnitudes. Other notable studies which found a significant positive association between gross 
domestic product and government spending include Okafor and Eiya (2011) who found that gross 
domestic product determines total government expenditure in Nigeria, while Edame (2014) 
observed that gross domestic product played a role in determining government investment 
expenditure in Nigeria. We can, thus, draw the conclusion that, in Kenya, as the yield in gross 
domestic increases, government consumption expenditure also increases along with it. 
Also, from table A26, the coefficient of foreign direct investment is -0.07263, and the p-value is 
0.000 which is significant at the 5 percent confidence level. The magnitude and the sign of the 
coefficient mean that in the long-run, percentage increase in foreign direct investment would 
cause government consumption spending to drop by 0.07263 percent, on average, ceteris paribus. 
This case, by intuition, could be because foreign investments complement government activities 
in providing employment and social welfare needs of the host country. Foreign investment 
agents subsidize the functions of the host country in a number of ways: apart introducing cutting 
age technologies in the production sector, they offer market completion to the host country, 
provide complementary role which has the advantage of bringing costs down and help improve 
the absorptive capacity of the host nation as far as funding and budgeting are concerned in order 
to minimize inefficiencies and wastages which characterize most host countries particularly in 
the Sub-Saharan Africa. As host governments strive to improve their absorptive capacity to 
attract more foreign investment agents, stringency measures have to be imposed on the budgetary 
composition of the government and may result in reduction of the unproductive components of 
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the budget. Girma (2003) also observed that the size, the type and the degree of impacts of 
foreign investment inflows largely depend on the absorptive capacity of the host nation. The 
results obtained by this study correspond to the findings got by Foye (2014)  who while 
examining the determinants of public investment expenditure in Nigeria observed that foreign 
direct investment are among the macroeconomic determinants of government investment 
expenditure in Nigeria. Following the foregoing argument we can conclude that foreign direct 
investment has impacted negatively on government consumption expenditure in Kenya and has 
asymmetrical effect with gross domestic product to government consumption spending. 
The coefficient of inflation rate is 1.822308 with a p-value of less than 5 percent critical value 
which shows that it is significant at the 5 percent confidence level. The sign and the magnitude 
indicate that in the long run, a per cent increase in inflation rate would cause 1.822 percent 
increase in government consumption expenditure, on average, ceteris paribus. This finding  
contradicts what Okafor and Eiya (2011) found when examining effects of inflation on 
government expenditure that there was no significant relationship between the two variables. 
Inflationary conditions are cyclical phenomena which are reflected in the general increase in  
price levels. Price volatility may be a serious problem to the treasury and the degree of impact 
depends on the optimal response by the treasury. Mostly when price shocks are observed then the 
government has got to revise its budgets usually with the easy tradeoff of slashing the 
development component of the budget. Reduction of recurrent component expenditure in the 
face of financial crises is not an easy option especially in developing countries. It is a common 
phenomenon that when budgetary revision is made on the recurrent components such us wages 
and salaries as an optimal response to observed shocks in price increases, it is more likely than 
not that the budget would be revised upwards. This happens because reducing salaries and wage 
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rates when prices are rising can easily meet a strong opposition waged by bandwagon of trade 
unionists that traditionally end up strikes and civil unrests. 
Finally, the coefficient of external debt stock is -2.60299 with a p-value of less than 5 percent 
critical value meaning that the coefficient was statistically significant. The statistical information 
we can derive from this result is that, in the long-run, a percentage increase in external debt level 
would result in a 2.6 percent decrease in government consumption expenditure in Kenya, on 
average, ceteris paribus. Aregbeyen and Akpan (2013) observed that government debt obligation 
reduced recurrent expenditure and all other components in the government budget for the case of 
Nigeria. This finding is also consistent with Mahdavi (2004) findings that external debt has a 
pivotal role to play in the allocation of the government budget. He found that external debt 
affects the structure of the government budget by increasing some shares of the public budget 
while starving other sectors. Kenya’s debt level continually has increased over the years since 
1963 to what many policy makers described as economically unsustainable and the external debt 
stock hit a record high 4.5 trillion in the year 2018. This has posed a serious problem in the 
allocation of the government budget considering the debt obligation that Kenya already had. 
Debt obligation is seen to starve certain components of the government budget especially the 
development category and sometimes where the government revenues are severely constrained it 
is accompanied with stringent fiscal policies measures. In 2018, the government of Kenya faced 
with the moral obligation to repay borrowed money and huge budget deficit to drive the 
envisaged flagship projects that were dabbed the big four agenda, the treasury had to issue 
austerity measures to bridge the budget deficit. The stringency measures included among others 
slashing of foreign and domestic travel costs to ensure leanness in government expenditure; 
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increase taxes by 8 percent to generate more revenue  and reduced sectoral budgets in order to 
reduce the budget deficit by  Ksh 23 billion, contends Mwangi (2018).  
 4.6.2 Short-Run coefficients of the structural Model  
This study estimated the system equation in the structural model which comprised of structural 
variables: centred value of urbanization rate (ZURB), centred value of young population 
(ZYOUNG), centred value of old population (ZOLD) and government consumption expenditure. 
Since the variables were integrated of the order I(1) and failed the Johansen test of cointegration, 
this study settled on VAR model to estimate the system of equation in the structural model.   
The estimation was conducted on the variables for the period 1963 to 2017 covering a total of 55 
observations to examine if there existed any short-run effects running from the variables 
urbanization rate, young population and old population to government consumption expenditure. 
In making decision about the significance of the estimates, the corresponding p-values of the 
coefficients were compared with the traditional 5 percent critical value. Whenever the 
probability value of test of the corresponding coefficients exceeded 5 percent critical then the 
null the hypothesis that there was short-run causality running to government consumption 
spending was rejected. The results obtained from the VAR estimation of the structural model are 
displayed in Table A28 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
109 
 
Table A28:  Vector autoregression for Structural Model 
Sample:  1965 - 2017                               No. of obs      =        53 
Log likelihood = -493.7229                         AIC             =  19.98954 
FPE            =  5717.709                         HQIC            =  20.50419 
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  1450.327                         SBIC            =  21.32785 
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
GC                    9     1.5e+08   0.9961   13377.06   0.0000 
ZURB                  9     .015748   0.9998   10270.21   0.0000 
ZYOUNG                9     .003376   1.0000   262117.8   0.0000 
ZOLD                  9      .00779   0.9999   13539.17   0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
GC           | 
          GC | 
         L1. |   .9995086   .1189346     8.40   0.000     .8396481    1.350524 
         L2. |  -.4879464   .1344519    -3.63   0.000    -.7514673   -.2244256 
             | 
        ZURB | 
         L1. |   1.28e+09   8.76e+08     1.47   0.143    -4.33e+08    3.00e+09 
         L2. |  -1.23e+09   9.34e+08    -1.32   0.188    -3.06e+09    6.02e+08 
             | 
      ZYOUNG | 
         L1. |   2.09e+09   4.05e+09     0.52   0.606    -5.85e+09    1.00e+10 
         L2. |  -2.24e+09   4.01e+09    -0.56   0.576    -1.01e+10    5.61e+09 
             | 
        ZOLD | 
         L1. |   6.501309   1.601307     4.06   0.000     3.361309    9.634709 
         L2. |  -5.713209   1.544111    -3.70   0.000    -8.74e+09   -2.691809 
             | 
       _cons |   7.00e+08   4.48e+08     1.56   0.118    -1.78e+08    1.58e+09 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Author, 2018 
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 Joint significance was conducted to check whether the lags of the respective variables jointly 
have significant effect to government consumption which is the target variable in the system 
equation. Granger Causality Wald test was used to check joint significance of the variables 
lagged values. The results are displayed in Table A29. 
Table A29: Granger Causality Wald tests 
   Granger causality Wald tests 
  +------------------------------------------------------------- 
  |    Equation           Excluded |   chi2     df Prob > chi2 | 
  |--------------------------------------+---------------------- 
  |          GC               ZURB |  2.3108     2    0.315    | 
  |          GC             ZYOUNG |   .7963     2    0.672    | 
  |          GC               ZOLD |  18.872     2    0.000    | 
  |          GC                ALL |  24.289     6    0.000    | 
  |--------------------------------+---------------------------| 
    Source: Author, 2018   
From Table A28 above, the results show that government consumption expenditure is strongly 
endogenous; that is, it exhibits weak exogeneity since the relation between its past values or 
lagged values is very strong as indicated by the test statistics and the corresponding p-values 
which are less than 1 percent significance level. The first lag of government shows a strong 
positive endogeneity with a coefficient of 1.095086 and p-value of less than 1 percent 
significance level. This indicates that there is a short causality running from the first lag of 
government consumption expenditure to the dependent variable government consumption 
expenditure. This also means that the previous realizations of government consumption 
expenditure were associated with the first lag of government consumption expenditure. The 
magnitude and the coefficient indicate that the previous realization of government consumption 
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expenditure is associated with 99.51 percent increase in government consumption expenditure, 
on average, ceteris paribus. The coefficient of the second lag of government consumption 
expenditure is also significant since the p-value is less than 1 percent critical value. The 
magnitude and sign indicate that the past values of government of government consumption 
expenditure in Kenya are associated with its own second lag.  This time round the negative 
implies that the government consumption expenditure in current year causes 48.8 percent fall in 
government consumption expenditure two years later.  However, the overall endogeneity was 
insignificant as indicated in the Granger Casuality test for joint significance in Table A28 above. 
From Table A28 above, the coefficient of the first lag and the second lag of the old population 
whose ages were 65 and above was significant as indicated by the test statistics and the 
corresponding p-values which were less than 1 percent critical level. This implied that there was 
short-run cuausality running from the first lag and the second lag of old population to 
government consumption expenditure. As can be seen from the table, Coefficient of the first lag 
is 6.50130, which shows that a percentage increase in the first lag of the old population aged 65 
years and above is associated with 65 percent increase in government consumption expenditure 
in Kenya, on average, ceteris paribus. However, the second lag has a negative coefficient of -
5.713209 which indicates that a percentage increase in the second lag of the old population aged 
65 years and above is associated with 57.1 percent decline in government consumption 
expenditure in Kenya. The overall exogeneity effect for the old population aged 65 and above 
was also significant as indicated in Granger Causality Wald test in Table A29 above. The 
outcome of this finding was expected following the argument that the population of elderly is 
associated with government expenditure in social protection programs. This finding is also 
consistent with the view that a high proportion of the population above 65 years will always 
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result in a shift of the budget to the social services to provide for old age pension and grants and 
governments need to take care of the of the disparities of dependency ratio of the population 
(Remmer, 2004; Sanz & Velzquez, 2002). This result also agrees with Edame (2014) who found 
that population density influence public expenditure on infrastructure in Nigeria. In Kenya there 
are massive government expenditure programs targeting the old age to cater for their 
vulnerability. The government offers a host of services ranging from payment of pensions to 
health services. By January 2018, the government of Kenya had already identified 556, 000 
people aged 70 years and above who applied for social cover by the government. This number 
excluded some 310, 000 persons who were already under social protection cover by the 
government, contends “Senior Citizens get government money”(2018).These programs are 
basically meant for social protection and restrain over dependency at old age. 
Ove rally, the variables urbanization rate, young population aged below years and the old aged 
65 years and above jointly affect government consumption expenditure in the short-run as 
indicated in the Granger Causality Wald test for joint significance. Just like the old population, 
government of Kenya pumps a lot of money towards health care and education of children below 
15 years. This finding resonates very well with the results of Ansari et al. (1997) who discovered 
a positive correlation between the variables. The need to improve pathetic life among urban 
dwellers has attracted a lot of government interest to improve sanitation and housing in major 
towns in Kenya. The government ensures that there is adequate and clean water for the urban 
dwellers and of more importance is the issue of garbage and waste disposal which ails most 
towns in Kenya. As stated by “Uhuru unveils water storage plan” (2018), Kenya has hatched a 
plan to provide a solution to water crisis in major towns. The latest statistics show that Kenya’s 
urban population was about 12.3 million in 2017 which formed 26.5 % of the total population 
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with a growing demand for better housing and sanitation services. Also, Shonchoy (2010) in a 
similar taste observed that there is significant positive association between the degree of 
urbanization and government expenditure because of ever emerging demands for public utilities 
and services in urban areas as the fraction of population living in urban areas increases. This 
finding is in agreement with the findings of Abu and Mustafa (2011) who argues that as the rate 
of urbanization increases, government has to incur additional expenses associated with new 
developments in urban centres. These expenditures include investments in security to provide 
peace and protection for the massive influx of people into the urban areas. As small towns 
graduate into cities, the autonomy of the central government over public goods and resources 
falls and for the government to continue asserting its authority even to the very smallest units of 
the urban dwellings, it forces the government to increase expenditure on delegated functions.  
Growth in urbanization is strongly associated with improvement in technology which has 
continued to attract especially the youth into cities. It has been the dream of many African 
countries and Kenya, in particular, to empower young people and ease unemployment in urban 
areas. The Kenyan government has always addressed this issue in various forms; one way is by 
funding Internet and communication technologies across counties. Other sources of expected 
investment growth as a result of growing urbanization include investments in the provision of 
social and physical facilities such as sewerage systems, roads upgrade, and street lighting. Good 
housing, good education, better sanitation and sewerage, better wages and remuneration have 
always defined the nature and characteristics of urban dwellers because it is the desire of any 
government to provide better living conditions of its people. Urban centres have increased 
appetite for good education, housing and health care services and the quest to provide such 
services have always attracted the city counter-part rural folks. Every year thousands of school 
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leavers throng into cities in pursuit of better living conditions and employment opportunities but 
in doing so they only add to the bad statistics of unemployment, overcrowding and poor housing. 
Population influx in cities has presented great financial burden to African governments and in 
this regard, additional resources have to be set aside to beef up security, improve sanitation and 
upgrade service delivery in the highly populated urban dwellings as a result of rural-urban 
migration. Following the foregoing, a conclusion was made that urbanization rate, young 
population and old population jointly affect government consumption expenditure in Kenya. 
4.6.3 Institutional effects of government consumption expenditure 
In estimating the institutional model, OLS was used. Government consumption expenditure was 
regressed against five sets of dummy variables: market liberation (SAP), political liberty 
(DEMOC), political cohesion (WAR), election periods (ELECT) and corruption (COR). Each of 
these dummy variables consisted of two levels except corruption which had six levels. Each 
attribute was coded 1 for presence and 0 otherwise. The estimation was conducted on the models 
for the period 1963 to 2017 covering a total of 55 observations. The significance of the 
coefficients were adjudged by comparing the probability values of the estimates with the 5 
percent critical values in which case the latter would turn out to be inferior then the null 
presumption of significance of the said coefficient is rejected at 5 percent level. The results of 
the estimation are shown in Table A30 below. 
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Table A30: OLS Regression Results 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =  55 
-------------+------------------------------     F( 9, 45) =  161.38 
       Model |  2.4930e+20     9  2.7700e+19     Prob > F  =  0.0000 
    Residual |  7.7241e+18    45  1.7165e+17      R-square =  0.9699 
-------------+------------------------------   Adj R-squared =0.9639 
       Total |  2.5702e+20    54  4.7597e+18    Root MSE   =  4.1e+08 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------   
          GC |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         SAP |   2.28e+08   2.44e+08     0.94   0.354    -2.62e+08    7.19e+08 
       DEMOC |   6.40e+08   3.25e+08     1.97   0.045    -1.40e+07    1.29e+09 
         WAR |   7.54e+08   2.57e+08     2.93   0.005     2.36e+08    1.27e+09 
       CHIGH |   3.81e+09   4.13e+08     9.23   0.000     2.98e+09    4.64e+09 
        CLOW |   1.30e+09   2.40e+08     5.39   0.000     8.12e+08    1.78e+09 
   CMODERATE |   2.88e+09   3.74e+08     7.70   0.000     2.12e+09    3.63e+09 
  CQUITEHIGH |   6.47e+09   4.13e+08    15.67   0.000     5.64e+09    7.31e+09 
   CQUITELOW |   8.41e+08   1.91e+08     4.40   0.000     4.56e+08    1.23e+09 
       ELECT |   1.22e+08   1.43e+08     0.85   0.398    -1.67e+08    4.11e+08 
       _cons |   5.49e+08   1.42e+08     3.88   0.000     2.64e+08    8.35e+08 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: Author, 2018 
The results of the OLS regression show that the explanatory variables jointly explain the 
variations in the dependent variable government consumption expenditure. 96.3 per cent of the 
variations that occur in government consumption expenditure are jointly explained by changes in 
the explanatory variables: market liberation, political liberty, political cohesion, elections and 
corruption. The probability of the f-statistics is less than which means that the coefficient of R-
squared is significant and therefore it meant that the model was well fitted.  
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The coefficient of political liberty was significant with a value of 6.40e+08 which represents a 
difference in government consumption expenditure between years when there was political 
liberty and years when there was no political freedom. Thus, showing that periods of political 
liberty are associated with more government consumption expenditure compared to periods of 
where there was no political liberty, on average, ceteris paribus. The findings, however, are 
consistent with the finding of Ansari et al. (1997) who discovered a positive link between the 
two variables. Many research studies point to the fact that investment spending is the most likely 
expenditure category that is prone to cuts in cases of financial shortages or in situations where 
there are political disagreements. Also, another consistency in this observation is seen in the 
findings of Kaufman and Stallings (1991) who argue that in a transition to democracy there is a 
lot of political payoff to meeting electorate demands for redistribution, because institutional 
uncertainty and short time horizons give politicians an incentive to heavily discount the potential 
political risks of future inflation and balance of payments adjustments.  Conversely, authoritarian 
regimes face no such calculus and are more likely to reduce social expenditure.  There are 
expansionary financial pressures that are associated with multi party governments. Most multi-
party governments are pro expenditure on social protection programs such as pension schemes 
and transfer funds. In Kenya, there has been a strong push from the minority parties together 
with the workers’ unions for the government to provide better livelihoods to the citizens. Apart 
from keeping the government of the day on its toss to provide basic services, multi-partysm 
represents an additional cost to the government of Kenya. The constitution of Kenya requires 
that the government funds a significant proportion of the electoral processes of registered parties. 
Precisely, about 0.3 percent of total revenues are disbursed to political parties to cover 
administrative costs. Thus, the government should provide proper and sound legislation on the 
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amount of funds that are allocated to political parties, corroborates Langa’t (2018). Thus, this 
study alongside other studies which have been mentioned, conclude that that democratic regimes 
tend allocate more resources to social programs than authoritarian regimes which have been 
witnessed in Kenya since its independent.       
Corruption Perception Index had six levels representing the degree of corruption: very low 
(CVERYLOW), quite low (CQUITELOW), low (CLOW), moderate (CMODERATE), quite 
high (CQUITEHIGH) and high (CHIGH). Normally when n levels of dummy variables are used 
to represent attributes, only n-1 levels are included in the regression. In practice, the lowest level 
is usually excluded, and thus this study eliminated the observations for very low (CLOW) in the 
regression and the coefficient of the included variables are interpreted in relation to the excluded 
attribute very low (CLOW). To see this clearly, the coefficients of corruption have been 
extracted from the OLS regression table to demonstrate this fact. 
Table A 31: Regression Coefficients of Corruption Attributes 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       CHIGH |   3.81e+09   4.13e+08     9.23   0.000     2.98e+09    4.64e+09 
        CLOW |   1.30e+09   2.40e+08     5.39   0.000     8.12e+08    1.78e+09 
   CMODERATE |   2.88e+09   3.74e+08     7.70   0.000     2.12e+09    3.63e+09 
  CQUITEHIGH |   6.47e+09   4.13e+08    15.67   0.000     5.64e+09    7.31e+09 
   CQUITELOW |   8.41e+08   1.91e+08     4.40   0.000     4.56e+08    1.23e+09 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: Author, 2018 
 The respective coefficients represent significant differences in government consumption 
expenditure between very low level of corruption and the respective levels included. Since this 
differences which are reflected in the coefficients of the attributes representing corruption are 
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greater than one, then it means that all the attributes of corruption included in the model 
contribute more to increases in government consumption expenditure than when the level of 
corruption is just very low (CVERYLOW). Thus, it can be stated here that, as degree of 
corruption increases, government consumption expenditure is also bound to increase along with 
it. This is demonstrated in the results when all other attributes representing higher levels report 
positive difference in the coefficient relative to the lowest level of corruption very low 
(CVERYLOW) as shown in Table A30 above.  This result is in agreement with the prior 
expectation of this study that corruption positively affects government spending. Corruption has 
a negative effect on the global reputation of a country, and these often scare away private 
investors. According to Leftie (2017), the latest statistics by Transparency International show 
that Kenya dropped by about six places in the 2016 global ranking of fight against corruption and 
the blame squarely lies in the weakness of government institutions which have failed to provide 
water tight measures to whip away graft malpractices. Many politicians lobby for classes of 
expenditure which they can easily get bribes on and go scot free and once they have identified 
these tiers of government expenditure, politicians tend to increase them to greater proportions in 
order to amass maximum bribe. In many cases, expenditure vote heads like allowances and other 
forms remunerations are the ones which often prone to increase by those bearing the 
responsibility to incur expenditure. We can conclude that as the corruption rating of the country 
increases, government consumption expenditure will increase. This finding agrees with the 
findings of Omar (1990), who argues that fraud cases in countries can be perpetrated through 
inflation of the prices of goods and services that the government purchases. As the government 
tries to fend off the index ratings, it will invest in public institutions by increasing capitations to 
it to enforce its anti-corruption policies. We thus conclude that corruption is a positive 
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determinant of government consumption expenditure. Corruption and fraud activities tend be 
associated with government expenses especially in areas which do not easily invoke audit 
queries from the general public. Expenditures on security and defense, according to Mauro 
(1998), are more likely to provide great opportunities for politicians to levy huge bribes. Political 
corruption begins when politicians start lobbying for more allocation of funds in such areas as 
state security and defense where they can easily receive bribes. On another account, corruption 
cases have a damaging effect on the image of a country in the global scenes. Rampant cases of 
frauds tend to scare away foreign investors, and this eliminates the complementary function of 
foreign investment to the host nation. Therefore, governments which operate in the absence of 
the complementary role of the private investors have to incur a lot more expenses in their pursuit 
to provide basic goods and services to the people. In Kenya, the Corruption Perception Index has 
considerably worsened, dropping to about six places in the 2016 global ranking report given by 
the Transparency International. Thus, the government is more likely to realize an increase in its 
consumption expenditure as the fraud cases increase. There have been calls by stakeholders and 
the international community for the Kenyan government to strengthen its institutions that 
oversight expenditures. In particular, after noticing a worry corruption trends across many 
African countries, Transparency International (2016) report notes that African leaders must 
strengthen institutions that hold their governments accountable, comments Leftie (2017). 
Another variable in the model whose effect was statistically significant was political instability. 
The attribute was captured by observing periods characterized by politically instigated wars. The 
regression results in Table A29 above show a positive coefficient of 7.54e+08 with p-value of 
0.005. Similarly, the coefficient of 7.54e+08 represents a positive departure in government 
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consumption expenditure from the level of government consumption expenditure when the event 
was not observed, that is, when there was no war. Starting from a point of reference where there 
are no politically instigated violence and wars and moving to a period of political instability, 
government consumption expenditure would increase by USD 7.54e+08, on average, ceteris 
paribus.   This finding corresponds to the observations made by Wiseman and Peacock (1961) 
who noted that public expenditure is poised to increase when states struggle and strive to meet 
demand which have placed before them by the citizens concerning a range of services that they 
wish to be rendered to them. According to Wiseman and Peacock (1961), there may be some 
sought of disagreement on what is the acceptable level of public spending and the desirable 
amount of burden in form of taxation caps and limits that the citizens can bear. More often than 
not political disagreements lead to widespread shocks in the form of devastating political turmoil 
and aggressions which have significant effects on the size of state expenditure, creating shifting 
effects, and consequently moving both public revenue and government spending to new levels. 
In the meantime, government begins to realize fiscal deficits, inadequate revenue collection and 
there would be growing need to raise taxes to meet fiscal targets. Before any consensus is 
reached concerning tax and revenue limits, citizens are likely to show their displeasure by way of 
riots and demonstrations. The government would be forced to make changes to the contentious 
and intolerable tax rates and adopt new tax levels, which Wiseman and Peacock called ‘tax 
tolerance level’,  which is the maximum level of tax burden that every citizen can bear.  In 
addition, the citizens will anticipate the government to rejuvenate the production of goods and 
services and remain alive to emerging issues in the society which would otherwise provoke the 
already healed society and which in consequence would create an environment for the recurrence 
of the previous shocks.  
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There have been several political disturbances in Kenya with far reaching economic costs. 
Destruction of property and general vandalism shape wars that have taken place in Kenya. In a 
bid bring back peace and tranquility, most individuals and parties who suffer what we call 
collateral damage have always sought assistance or sometimes complete recompense to damages 
from the state. In Kenya there are thousands of people who have lost their property to acts of war 
and violence and many of them have been compensated in one way or the other. In 2018, a 
section of those who suffered collateral damages during the 2017 post-election skirmishes sought 
for legal assistance towards state recompense and were awarded Ksh 6.3 billion after a Kenyan 
court had ruled in their favour, observed Ogina (2018). Thus, there are tendencies of countries 
experiencing huge budget estimates during times of war and such cases would force the 
government to devise strategic ways of raising additional revenues to meet the increase in 
defense expenditure and reconstruction costs. Such growth in revenue, therefore, gives rise to 
increased government expenditure. That is to say; government spending is driven by great 
economic crises which can change public expenditure.  According to Salen (2017), countries 
across the world lose billions of money to war to more than what states invest in peace building. 
On average, the world spends about $13.6 trillion a year on war related issues. It is not surprising 
to say that the economy of the “war world” is even much larger than the Kenyan economy and in 
fact what the whole world spends in wars is enough to run multiple economies in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the summary, conclusions and policy consequences of the study's findings. 
This chapter is split into four parts. Section 5.2 presents the summary of the study, section 5.3 
presents the main conclusions, and section 5.4 presents the policy implications arising from the 
study and finally section 5.5 cover areas for further research.   
5.2 Summary 
This study has been undertaken to find out the determinants of government consumption 
expenditure in Kenya. The specific aims of the study are to establish the economic factors which 
cause the growth in government consumption expenditure in Kenya, to find out the structural 
causes of government consumption expenditure in Kenya, and to establish the politico-
institutional determinants of government consumption expenditure in Kenya. The study 
estimates two models where various variables entered into each of the models.  
For the economic model, the findings of the study show that, gross domestic product and its first 
lag, inflation rate foreign direct investment, and external debt stock are all statistically important 
in providing explanations to the changes in government consumption expenditure in Kenya at the 
5 percent significance level.  The inflation rate, gross domestic product and first lag of gross 
domestic product, on the one hand, have positive effects on government consumption 
expenditure. In the long-run, 1USD increase in domestic resources causes USD 1.3 increase in 
government consumption expenditure in Kenya. Similarly, a unit increase in inflation rate causes 
USD 1.8 increase in government expenditure. 1USD increase in foreign direct investment leads 
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to USD 0.07 decrease in expenditure while 1USD increase in external debt stock results in USD 
2.6 decrease in government consumption expenditure in Kenya.  
For the structural model, the results indicate that the three variables urbanization rate, young 
population and old population jointly cause increase in government consumption expenditure in 
Kenya in the short-run. Also, the first lag and the second lag of old population was found to have 
a positive influence on government consumption expenditure in Kenya while the second had 
negative impact. 
For the political-institutional model, the results indicate that political instability, political liberty 
and Corruption are statistically strong in providing explanations to the variations in public 
consumption expenditure in Kenya. As for political instability, the significance of the beta 
coefficient shows that there is a significant positive difference in the government consumption 
expenditure between the periods when there was no political violence and the periods when there 
was political disturbances. Likewise, the introduction of multi-party politics in Kenya and 
instances of corruption are associated with increase in government consumption expenditure in 
Kenya.  
5.3 Conclusions  
Based on the objectives and the findings of the study, we can draw a number of conclusions. The 
conclusions are based on only the variables that were found to be statistically significant. Three 
objectives were identified to guide the study. 
The findings of the economic model give answers to the first objective of the study that 
economic determinants of government consumption expenditure are gross domestic product, 
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inflation rate, foreign direct investment and external debt stock. While gross domestic product 
and inflation rate are positive determinants, foreign direct investment and external debt stock 
turned out to be negative determinants of government consumption spending in Kenya in the 
long-run.   
To the second objective of the study, the findings of the structural model yielded answers to the 
problem that structural determinants of government consumption expenditure in Kenya include 
the joint effect of urbanization, young population and old population. These three variables 
jointly cause government consumption expenditure in the short-run. Individually, the first lag of 
old population cause increase in government consumption expenditure while the second lag of 
old has significant  negative effect on government consumption expenditure in Kenya in the 
short-run. 
Finally, for the third objective the political and institutional determinants were identified by the 
institutional model whose estimations reveal that political liberty, political instability and 
corruption are the political and institutional determinants of government consumption 
expenditure in Kenya, ceteris paribus. All the three variables have a significant positive impact 
on government consumption expenditure. 
5.4 Policy Implications 
The results obtained from this study are quite informative and is very useful to policy 
formulation and implementation. Prudent fiscal policy measures should be put in place to 
cushion inflationary measure.  Inflationary fiscal policies have the tendency of bloating the 
government budget. 
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The government should create conducive environment for foreign investment as this will 
complement a good portion of activities and reduce its financial burden. Foreign investors will 
absorb labor and reduce the government burden on remuneration of employs.   
The government should be very much cautious of the debt level and avoid over-borrowing since 
debt obligation has a severe impact on the government budget, creating huge deficits which 
when are tax financed lead to increases in prices which again inflate the government budget. 
The government should be up to date with urban dynamics and have accurate forecast about 
urbanization in readiness to meet consumption expenditure associated with development in 
towns and cities. Upsurge in population in urban dwellings can be restrained by checking on 
rural-urban migration. Appropriate methods to absorb people in jobs at local levels should be 
devised. 
The government should take keen interest in empowering its citizens at younger ages to avoid 
vulnerability at later years which is associated huge government expenditure. This will reduce 
instances of, for example, free transfers to the old as way of social protection. 
Adequate resources, in terms of capitation and personnel, should be given to institutions such 
Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission that are mandated to deal with graft and rent seeking 
behaviors in order to effectively control and ensure efficiency and leanness in government 
spending. 
Peace building should remain as one of the mega projects of the government. The government 
should ensure that the political class do not propagate divisive politics that usually end up in 
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serious political tensions. Legislations on incitements and instigation of political violence should 
be strengthened and strictly adhered to. 
5.5 Areas for Further Research 
This study has extensively examined the determinants of government consumption spending in 
Kenya. Government consumption spending is the dependent variable which comprises of two 
categories of expenditure: productive government consumption expenditure and non-productive 
government consumption expenditure. Thus, a study of these two tiers of government 
expenditure can be conducted in relation to their determinants or with reference to GDP in 
Kenya. 
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Appendix 1: Study Data 
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14.0
2 
294,294,878,546 0.18 2.568 
7.77E+09 
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0 1 1 5 0 
2012 6,305,701,039 44,380,180,300 2,547 9.38 328,307,096,805 0.15 2.659 
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9.95E+09 
0.33 
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5 
0 1 0 5 1 
2014 6,801,220,706 49,506,417,104 2,957 6.88 483,261,822,519 0.18 3.008 
1.36E+10 
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7 
0 1 0 5 0 
2015 7,584,735,804 52,337,445,097 3,162 6.58 492,962,773,993 0.16 2.725 
1.59E+10 
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19529772 
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8 
0 1 0 5 0 
2016 8,227,853,512 55,409,230,682 3,368 6.30 496,240,651,479 0.14 2.477 
1.9E+10 
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0 
0 1 0 5 0 
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2 
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Source: Various Issues of Kenya Economic Surveys and Statistical Abstracts, World Bank 
Country Data Portal, UNCTAD Country Development Index, 2018 
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